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I.     INTRODUCTION 
The time for a federal usury cap has come. Setting interest rate caps on 
consumer loans has historically been left up to the states,2 yet states have 
been unable to legislate or enforce effective interest rate caps on consumer 
loans. Congress, on the other hand, has the capacity to efficiently and effec-
tively enter this space, as it has in so many critical consumer and commer-
cial law settings. Morever, despite the fact that Americans overwhelmingly 
believe there should be interest rate caps on consumer loans,3 triple and 
quadruple-digit interest rate store-front loans and 1,000% Internet loans are 
now commonplace in the majority of American states. Online payday loans 
proliferate in all states, regardless of the laws of these states, despite hercu-
lean efforts on the part of state legislatures to enact laws and state courts to 
enforce those laws. Millions of taxpayer dollars have been spent in these 
battles, yet the result of states’ attempts has been only inefficiency and 
waste.  
There are several reasons for this waste. First, most states have not 
implemented any rate caps on consumer loans, despite their citizens’ desire 
  
 2. Since the effective deregulation of interest rate caps in Marquette National Bank 
v. First Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), discussed further in Part II below, many 
states have dispensed with state usury caps. 
 3. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text. 
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for such caps.4 Second, in states that have implemented laws regulating 
specific loan products, such as payday loans and title loans, lenders have 
used various work-arounds and loopholes to continue offering triple-digit 
interest rate loans. These work-arounds are embarrassingly easy to imple-
ment, either by changing the loan products to fall outside narrowly drawn 
existing regulation, by restructuring the loan provider to fit within an exist-
ing exception to usury caps, by teaming with Indian tribes in order to avail 
lenders of tribal sovereign immunity and avoid state laws, or by moving to 
an unregulated state to escape the reach of state laws.  
Even in states with very simple, across-the-board interest rate caps on 
all loans, lenders still avail themselves of tribal and offshore options, or, in 
some cases, simply flagrantly violate the law without a loophole, making it 
necessary for consumers to sue them for the violation. Lenders then rely on 
broad anti-class action and arbitration clauses in contracts in order to escape 
liability.5 The legislative and judicial waste created by these piecemeal bat-
tles leads to an inexorable conclusion: the efforts of states have largely 
failed.6  
Indeed, the time has come to pass a federal usury cap for all Ameri-
cans, similar to the one currently applicable to military personnel.7 Con-
  
 4. See Timothy E. Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps, State Legisla-
tion, and Public Opinion: Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
115, 116-17 (2014). In this Article, Professor Goldsmith and I explore public opinion about 
interest rate caps through empirical research. Here I use this data, my prior research on pay-
day loan loopholes of various kinds, as well as unconscionability doctrine and case law, to 
conclude that we need a federal rather than a state solution to sky-high consumer loan inter-
est rates.  
 5. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.  
 6. Colorado is an exception in that it has been proactive in regulating 
payday loans without causing them to leave the state, thus attempting to 
balance consumers’ and lenders’ interests. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-
101 to 5-3.1-123 (2011), quoted in Amy Schmitz, Females on the Fringe: 
Considering Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65, 
76-77 (2014). See also infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (detailed discussion of 
Colorado's law).  
 7. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C.A. § 987(b) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 113-74) [hereinafter MLA] (capping 
interest rates on payday loans, tax refund loans, and car title loans at 36%). See also Creola 
Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians from Payday 
Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 650 (2012). In this article, Professor Johnson ar-
gues that the civilian population is actually more vulnerable to ensnarement in predatory 
loans and less protected by a social safety net, so that the need for such protections for the 
military, as evidenced by the Military Lending Act (MLA), proves the need for the civilian 
population. Id. In addition to explaining these practices, the potential regulations, and the 
CFPB’s authority to create such a regulatory framework, she argues that a multi-faceted 
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sumer borrowing is impervious to state borders, meaning that the entire 
country is a common consumer lending market. Moreover, states have no 
particular local interests in interest rate caps. There is a need for uniformity 
in interest rates across states, which only Congress can provide.  
This Article calls on Congress to set a federal interest rate cap of 36%, 
applicable to all loans. 8 Part II of this Article briefly describes the history 
of usury laws in the United States and then describes the patchwork nature 
of modern usury law. Part III describes various types of consumer loans, 
including high-cost loans like payday and title loans. Part III then reviews 
evidence of public opinion regarding interest rate caps for consumer loans, 
showing that Americans of both political parties favor caps of 36% or less 
by a wide margin. Given the broad and deep public support for interest rate 
caps, the question is not whether but how to accomplish these caps. 
Part IV, the heart of the Article, describes the many ways in which 
state regulation of high cost lending has been inefficient and ineffective. 
Part IV.A describes the various forms of legislation that have attempted but 
failed to lower interest rates and curb other abuses in high-cost lending. It 
describes in detail the many work-arounds used by lenders to avoid what-
ever state law is enacted. These work-arounds include changing loan prod-
ucts to get around narrow definitions in state statutes, morphing lenders into 
another type of entity to get around the state statutes, or moving to lending 
online through Indian tribe affiliation or offshore entities. Part IV.B de-
scribes the difficulties with trying to enforce state statutes through judicial 
means. It discusses the unconscionability doctrine and its resulting incon-
sistent case law, the delays caused by lender bankruptcy, the difficulties 
posed by recent Supreme Court law on the enforceability of anti-class ac-
tion clauses and arbitration clauses in high-cost loan contracts, and finally, 
the mere cost of enforcement litigation as a whole.  
Working toward finding a solution to this problem of state ineffective-
ness in regulating high-cost credit, Part V describes Congress’s power to 
regulate consumer credit as well as some of the general benefits of regulat-
ing at a federal as opposed to a state level. This section also describes one 
example of a federal usury cap enacted by Congress, the Military Lending 
Act, which caps interest at 36% for loans made to military personnel. This 
  
strategy is needed to address the problem. Using its educational mandate, she suggests ways 
in which the CFPB can use social media and other techniques to foster expansion of afforda-
ble low-cost loans, which would be issued under a CFPB safe harbor provision. Id. at 670-
75. Even the MLA has loopholes however. See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.  
 8. Others have also suggested the need for a federal usury cap. See, e.g., Leah 
Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How States Protect 
Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 31, 50-51 (2011) (stating that Congress should enact a federal usury cap of 36%); 
Johnson, supra note 7. 
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section describes how a similar but improved law could benefit all Ameri-
cans. Finally, Part VI provides a roadmap for Congress in enacting a loop-
hole-free federal usury cap.  
II.     THE LAW OF USURY IN THE U.S. 
This Part describes the history of usury caps in the United States as 
well as the current law of usury in the United States. 
A. HISTORY OF USURY IN THE U.S.  
Until twenty-five years ago, most U.S. states had usury laws that 
capped interests on consumer loans.9 In the U.S., usury laws have histori-
cally been the main protection consumers have had against harsh credit 
practices. Usury dates back to the earliest recorded civilizations and has a 
very prominent role in early American laws.10 The first U.S. laws were bor-
rowed from England’s 5% Statute of Anne.11 The English usury laws that 
this country inherited grew out of the moral view that charging more than 
5% was wrong.12 Similarly, in the 1400s and 1500s, Catholic and Protestant 
churches espoused rates of no higher than 8%.13 
The first American usury law was adopted by Massachusetts in 1641, 
imposing an 8% per annum cap.14 As Christopher Peterson explains:  
Early American usury laws were all written in clear 
terms, specifying a maximum simple nominal an-
nual interest rate. These seminal American statutes 
were undiluted, trim, and perhaps even elegant in 
comparison to contemporary statutes that employ a 
variety of different types of interest rates and in-
clude a host of exceptions for various fees and dif-
ferent types of lenders.15 
All thirteen of the original states adopted usury caps of between 5% 
and 8%, which remained in place until the late 1800s and early 1900s, when 
salary lenders found ways around these caps and began charging 500% or 
  
 9. See Christopher Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, Statutory Sleight of Hand: 
Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (2008). 
 10. See id. at 1113. 
 11. See id. at 1116. 
 12. See id. at 1116-17 
 13. See id. at 1117. 
 14. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 1117. 
 15. Id. 
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more.16 Next, a social reformer named Arthur Ham, working with the well-
funded Russell Sage Foundation, drafted a model statute that eliminated 
these practices and capped interest at 24-42% per annum.17 The resulting 
small loan laws adopted by the states required all consumer lenders to ob-
tain licenses from state governments in exchange for the ability to charge 
these higher rates.18  
Salary lenders were ultimately pushed out by competition from tradi-
tional lenders,19 but interest rate caps remained more or less in place 
throughout the United Sates until the Supreme Court’s decision in Mar-
quette National Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp.,20 in which the Supreme 
Court was asked to decide which state’s usury law applies when a national 
bank lends money to a consumer in another state—that of the consumer or 
that of the bank.21 When the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the bank’s 
state rate applied, states began eliminating their usury caps in order to at-
tract financial institutions to their states, with South Dakota and Delaware 
eliminating their caps first.22 The decision effectively deregulated state in-
terest rate caps by allowing national banks headquartered in a state without 
usury caps to export their lack of an interest rate cap on consumers in any 
state.23 State lenders soon lobbied Congress for the same right, which Con-
  
 16. See id. at 1118-19. Salary lenders were able to undermine usury caps by using 
confessions of judgment and profitable relationships with magistrate judges. See id. at 1119-
20. See also Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 807, 810-12 (2012). 
 17. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 1120.  
 18. See id. at 1121. 
 19. See id. at 1120. 
 20. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
 21. See id. at 309-13. See also Schmitz, supra note 6, at 92. As Professor Schmitz 
notes: 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the National Bank Act 
(“NBA”) to allow national and state chartered banks and thrifts to “ex-
port” favorable laws from their home states in order to circumvent less-
favorable laws in other states where they do business . . . [meaning] that 
a bank chartered in Delaware may impose its interest rates on consumers 
in Colorado without worry about Colorado usury rate laws. Payday 
lenders use this to their advantage by affiliating with banks in states al-
lowing for higher rates, and banks have started payday loan subsidiaries. 
Internet and out-of-state payday lenders seek to use the dormant com-
merce clause to challenge states’ imposition of regulations on those who 
lend to their citizens. 
Id.
 
 
 22. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 1122. 
 23. See id. at 1122. 
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gress granted.24 Thereafter, banks at least, could charge customers whatever 
rate they liked.25  
This led to feelings of unfairness by non-bank lenders who were stuck 
with interest rate caps. Personal finance companies and other small non-
bank lenders eventually began their own fights against state usury caps, 
causing even more states to eliminate their interest rate caps.26 Soon the old 
salary lenders reinvented themselves as payday lenders, a transformation 
process that continues to this day.27  
Originally, because of Jacksonian Democrats’ concern over the power 
of federal banks, usury has historically been the domain of states, not the 
federal government.28 In enacting the National Bank Act of 1863, Congress 
explicitly allowed national banks to charge interest at the rates allowed by 
the state in which the bank was located.29 At that time, however, lending 
was a strictly local business, and it made sense for usury to be a local issue 
as well. Today lending is a national, if not global, endeavor.  
  
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 1123. 
 27. See Peterson, supra note 9, at 1123. 
 28. But see Martin S. Tanner, Note, Usury Implications of Alternative Mortgage 
Instruments: The Uncertainty in Calculating Permissive Returns, 1986 BYU L. REV. 1105, 
1105 (1986). As Tanner notes in footnote five, however, federal usury laws have been in 
effect in some form or another since the 1800s. See id. at 1106 n.5 (citing National Bank 
Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 108 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1983))). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2013). While state legislatures are now effectively in charge of 
whether there is a usury cap on consumer loans in their states, Congress clearly has the pow-
er to enact a federal usury cap under the commerce clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. 
art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Indeed, in 2007, it did just that in passing the Military Lending Act, which 
caps interest on all consumer loans made to the military at 36%. See Military Lending Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. § 987(b) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 113-74)) (capping interest rates on 
certain payday loans, tax refund loans, and car title loans at 36%). As Part V explains, this 
law also has limitations, which Congress can avoid in future legislation. See infra notes 192-
215 and accompanying text. The Military Lending Act was passed in response to research 
showing that high-cost lenders tend to congregate around military bases where people have 
low but regular paychecks. The proliferation of high-cost lenders among military personnel 
was seen as a threat to morale as well as national security. TOM FELTNER, JEAN ANN FOX & 
LAURA UDIS, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, POLICY BRIEF: GAPS IN THE MILITARY 
LENDING ACT LEAVE MANY SERVICE MEMBERS VULNERABLE TO ABUSIVE LENDING 
PRACTICES (2013), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/130725-policybrief-mla-
cfa.pdf. In enacting this Act, Congress relied on evidence that “[p]redatory lending under-
mines military readiness, harms the morale of troops and their families, and adds to the cost 
of fielding an all-volunteer fighting force.” DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING 
PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS  53 
(2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf. In its 
report of the effectiveness of the Act, the Consumer Federation of America also found that 
lenders are finding ways around the Military Lending Act. FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra 
note 29, at 4. 
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B. THE CURRENT PATCHWORK OF LAWS ON INTEREST RATE 
CAPS  
Lending is no longer a local affair. Nevertheless, there currently is no 
federal law regulating the specific terms of consumer loans, although the 
Truth in Lending Act,30 the Electronic Fund Transfer Act,31 and other gen-
eral federal laws apply to online lending. Whether to have a usury cap is 
left to states and some states still cap interest on all consumer loans. For 
example, along most of the eastern seaboard, it is still common for the law 
to cap the amount of interest and fees a lender can charge for any type of 
consumer loan in a way that Professor Peterson describes as “undiluted and 
trim.”32 In other words, no lender can charge more than 18% or 36% for a 
loan of any kind, no exceptions. I will refer to those kinds of laws as those 
with “true caps.”  
In most of the country, however, true caps are rare indeed. More spe-
cifically, eighteen states plus the District of Columbia either forbid payday 
lending or cap interest rates in a fashion that makes lending undesirable.33 
The rest of the states have either no regulation of consumer loans, have 
regulations that affirmatively allow the high-cost products described above, 
or have piecemeal laws that apply to one or more of the various types of 
loans. The resulting legislative patchwork has kept legislatures and con-
sumer protections organizations busy around the clock, but has not resulted 
in any overall decrease in high-cost loans or in interest rates on such loans. 
To the contrary, the high-cost lending industry is growing exponentially, 
faster than any other part of the consumer credit sector.34  
  
 30. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006). 
 31. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2006).  
 32. Peterson, supra note 9, at 1111. 
 33. CFED, PROTECTIONS FROM PREDATORY SHORT-TERM LOANS (2012), available at 
http://cfed.org/assets/scorecard/2013/rg_PredatoryLending_2013.pdf. The states that ban or 
cap payday loans at 36% or less are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virgin-
ia. Id. See also Payday Lending Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx. 
 34.  CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, UNITED STATES UNDERBANKED FINANCIAL 
SERVICES ARE A $78 BILLION MARKETPLACE THAT ENCOMPASSES CLOSE TO TWO-DOZEN 
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES PROVIDED TO OVER 68 MILLION CONSUMERS (2011), available at  
http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI_2011_Underbanked_Market_Sizing_Stud
y_November_2012.pdf. This is a newsletter for the Center for Financial Services Innovation 
(CFSI), which claims to be: 
[T]he nation’s leading authority on financial services for un-
derserved consumers. Through insights gained by producing 
original research; promoting cross-sector collaboration; advis-
ing organizations and companies by offering specialized con-
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III.     PAYDAY-STYLE LENDING AND PUBLIC OPINION 
Parts of this Article were presented at a conference on a panel entitled 
“Aberrant Contracts.”35 The panel title raises the question of what exactly 
makes a contract aberrant. According to Merriam-Webster, aberrant means 
“straying from the right or normal way” or “deviating from the usual or 
natural type.”36 Reasonable minds could disagree quite vehemently about 
what is right or natural, but they should be able to agree on what is normal 
or usual. To determine what is normal or usual in the realm of consumer 
loans, it is helpful to look at examples of interest rates on various types of 
consumer loans, including high-cost loans, as well as at public opinion of 
the appropriateness of interest rate caps in the context of consumer loans. 
This section demonstrates that high-cost lending rates are not normal, par-
ticularly when considering interest rates on other credit products as well as 
public opinion on such caps.  
A. TERMS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF CONSUMER LOANS 
If the likely reader of this law review Article walked into a bank or 
credit union and asked for a small short-term loan, the person would likely 
pay an interest rate of 10-18%.37 Money borrowed on a credit card might 
run the average reader of this Article similar charges, perhaps higher inter-
est if the person’s credit is scarred.38 A loan from a traditional financial 
institution, like a bank or credit union, on an unencumbered auto might run 
  
sulting services; shaping public policy; and investing in non-
profit organizations and start-ups, CFSI delivers a deeply in-
terconnected suite of services benefiting underserved consum-
ers.  
Id. at 8. As a pro-payday and title loan industry group, its research is funded by Morgan 
Stanley. Id. See also Fahzy Abdul-Rahman, Small-Dollar Predatory Lending and Bad 
Loans, GUIDE G-260 (N.M. State Univ., Coll. of Agric., Consumer, and Envtl. Scis., La 
Cruces, N.M.),Nov. 2012, at 1, available at http://aces.nmsu.edu/pubs/_g/G260.pdf. Abdul-
Rahman reports that between 1992 and 2000, the number of predatory lenders in New Mexi-
co grew from one per 66,000 citizens to one for every 5,212 citizens. Id. 
 35. This Article was written in connection with the panel entitled Aberrant Con-
tracts, held by the AALS Section on Commercial Law and Related Consumer Lawat the 
2013 AALS Meeting in Washington, D.C. 
 36. Aberrant Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/aberrant (last visited Aug. 5, 2013). 
 37. Interest Rates, ECONOMIC RESEARCH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/22 (last visited Aug. 8, 2013). 
 38. Id. 
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such a person anywhere from 5% for a good credit risk, up to 21% for a 
poor credit risk.39 
There are many varieties of high-cost loans, with markedly different 
terms. One example is the so called “installment loan” created in order to 
skirt a state law requiring loans made for fourteen to thirty-five days to lim-
it interest and fees to $15 per $100 borrowed for up to fourteen days per 
loan. Lenders making installment loans can avoid state payday loan laws by 
making loans with durations longer than thirty-five days. Longer loans fall 
outside the regulations and thus remain unregulated. In one such installment 
loan, a customer borrowed $100, to be repaid in twenty-six bi-weekly in-
stallments of $40.16 each, plus a final installment of $55.34.40 In total, this 
borrower paid $1,099.71 on a $100 loan. The annual percentage rate on the 
loan was 1,147%.41  
Another example is a true “payday” loan, so named because its origi-
nal purpose was to help a customer survive a short-term cash flow crisis 
between the time of the loan and the customer’s next payday.42 In one 
common form of payday loan, a consumer borrows money at a rate of be-
tween $15 and $25 per $100 for a period of fourteen days or less.43 In other 
words, if a consumer was paid four days ago but is already out of cash, she 
can go borrow, for example, $400 between now and her next payday (now 
  
 39. Id. High-cost loans like payday or title loans cost fifty to one hundred times 
those rates of interest. While one could argue that the borrowers that use these high-cost 
products cannot get a bank or credit union loan, this is not necessarily true. Interview with 
Marvin Ginn, Executive Director, Native Community Finance (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with 
author) (indicating that some title loan and payday loans customers can obtain loans from 
traditional lenders). See also Transcript of Interview With Clinic Client Regarding Title 
Loan (April 30, 2011) (on file with author). In this case, a 300% title loan was given to a 
woman who suffered brain damage in an auto accident. The loan was ultimately taken over 
by a local credit union. Even if it were true, this fact may or may not justify these differences 
in interest rate costs. Nor do these differences even begin to answer the question of whether 
high-cost loans do more harm than good for their borrowers. Nor is that the point; here we 
are merely trying to determine the meaning of “normal” or “usual” in the context of con-
sumer credit. 
 40. See New Mexico ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010CV-2009-01916 
at 1-2 (1st Dist. N.M., Dec. 3, 2010) (on file with author). See also Felix Salmon, Loan 
Sharking Datapoints of the Day, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking-datapoints-of-the-day/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 41. This assumes the lender is not able to convince the borrower to re-borrow the 
principal before the loan is paid back. See infra Part III.A. 
 42. See Ronald Mann & James Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 
857 (2007) (explaining the mechanics of a typical payday loan); Karen E. Francis, Note, 
Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis of the Payday Loan Industry, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2010) (describing a payday loan transaction). 
 43. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of 
Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (2010) (giving an example 
of a typical payday loan). 
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ten days away). To get that $400 at the $15 per $100 rate she would need a 
checking account and would write a check, or authorize an automatic debit, 
for $460 post dated to her next payday.44 When payday comes, she can ei-
ther let the check or debit clear, assuming the unlikely event that she now 
has this money, or she can go in and pay another $60 to borrow the same 
$400 for the next two weeks. This loan carries an annual interest rate of 
390% or more.  
Still another example is the auto title loan, for which consumers do not 
need bank accounts.45 Rather, borrowers simply need an unencumbered 
automobile to secure the loan. These loans carry a typical interest rate of 
25% per month or 300% per annum. While title loans typically carry lower 
interest rates than payday loans, they tend to be larger loans, increasing the 
chances that they will be difficult to repay and will create debt traps.46 They 
also subject borrowers to the possibility of losing their vehicles, a risk not 
encountered with the other forms of high-cost loans described here. As Part 
II.B above explained, some states limit the availability of triple-digit inter-
est rate loans. Most, however, do not. Interest rates ranging from 300% per 
annum to over 1,000% per annum hardly appear normal in today’s credit 
world, a supposition bolstered by public opinion, discussed below.   
B. PUBLIC OPINION OF INTEREST RATES AND INTEREST RATE 
CAPS  
In every study or survey in which the public has been asked to com-
ment,47 the American public overwhelmingly supports government imposi-
  
 44. Id. 
 45. See Jim Hawkins, Kathryn Fritzdixon & Paige Marta Skiba, Dude, Where’s My 
Car Title: The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224247; Nathalie Martin & 
Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic Realities in 
Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41 (2012). 
 46. Notably, Professor Jim Hawkins has found that borrowers do not fully under-
stand the costs of title loans. See Hawkins, supra note 45. The people he surveyed did not 
exhibit an understanding of the high relative cost of title loans compared to credit card debt. 
Id. Only 25.71% (n = 9) recognized that a title loan is a lot more expensive than credit card 
debt, while 17.14% (n = 6) thought a title loan is a lot less expensive than credit card debt. 
Id. 5.71% (n = 2) thought a title loan was a little less expensive than credit card debt, and 
31.43% (n = 11) thought the two were about the same cost. Id. While this small sample of 
people may not be indicative of borrowers generally, it is disturbing how few people under-
stood the relative cost of their title loan. 
 47. CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. ASS’N OF AM., PAYDAY LOANS AND THE BORROWERS 
EXPERIENCE (2013), available at 
http://cfsaa.com/Portals/0/Harris_Interactive/CFSA_HarrisPoll_ExecutiveSummary.pdf. 
While this industry study indicates that payday loan borrowers appreciate having the option 
of taking out a payday loan, it by no means suggests that borrowers appreciate the 500% 
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tion of interest rate caps on consumer loans. Nationally, a survey by the 
Center for Responsible Lending shows that three out of four Americans 
who expressed an opinion think that Congress should cap interest rates, and 
72% felt that the caps should be no higher than 36%.48  
State ballot initiatives glean the same results. For example, in Mon-
tana, 72% of the population supported a ballot initiative that ultimately re-
sulted in a 36% cap on interest rates for all loans in Montana.49 Citizens of 
Kentucky also voted for a ballot initiative that ultimately capped all loans at 
36%.50 Similarly, Arizonans overwhelmingly supported a ballot initiative 
  
interest rates. My recent study suggests that people who have taken out payday loans are 
more likely to believe in interest rate caps than those that have not. See generally Goldsmith 
& Martin, supra note 4. 
 48.  CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CONGRESS SHOULD CAP INTEREST RATES: 
SURVEY CONFIRMS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CRACKING DOWN ON HIGH-COST LENDING (2009), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-
legislation/congress/interest-rate-survey.pdf; Christopher L. Peterson, 'Warning: Predatory 
Lender' - A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 893, 893 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971971 stating that: 
Over a hundred different local governments around the coun-
try have adopted ordinances restricting high cost, small loans. 
This trend reflects the solid majority of the American public 
that opposes the legality of triple-digit interest rate loans and 
the long historical tradition of treating “payday” and car-title 
lending as a serious civil offense or even a crime. 
Id. n.1 (citing  CTR. FOR POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP, POLL ON PAYDAY LENDING LEG-
ISLATION (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.c-
pe.org/download/PaydayLendingReform/PollPaydayLending.pdf) (stating that a weighted 
sample of 500 Colorado voters found “74% of respondents are in favor of proposed legisla-
tion that will set a cap of 36% on the interest and fees that a company can charge for payday 
loans”). 
 49. LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, RESULTS OF A STATEWIDE SURVEY ON A MONTANA 
BALLOT INITIATIVE TO CAP INTEREST RATES OF PREDATORY LENDERS (Jan. 2010), available 
at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Publicmemo-MT-Payday.pdf; Payday Lenders Less 
Popular than Liquor Stores, Majority of Voters Would Support Moratorium, According to 
San Jose Poll, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/Payday-lenders-
less-popular-than-liquor-stores-majority-of-voters-would-support-moratorium-according-to-
San-Jos%C3%A9-poll.html#; Poll Shows Support For Capping Payday Loan Rates And 
Fees, THE VINDICATOR (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:25 AM), 
http://www.thevindicator.com/news/article_2d0406f0-6714-11e2-997e-0019bb2963f4.html; 
Montana Loan Interest Rate Limit, I-64 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA (Jul. 6, 2012, 11:54 AM), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Montana_Loan_Interest_Rate_Limit,_I-164_(2010) 
(reporting that nearly 72% of Montana voters voted to cap interest rates on payday and auto 
title loans at 36% APR); Ohio Payday Lender Interest Rate Cap, Issue 5 (2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA (Aug. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), 
http://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Payday_Lender_Interest_Rate_Cap,_Issue_5_(2008). 
 50. KY. COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, KENTUCKY VOTERS SUPPORT A 36 
PERCENT RATE CAP ON PAYDAY LOANS, DESPITE DATABASE AND JOB LOSS THREATS, availa-
ble at http://kyresponsiblelending.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Poll-data-fact-sheet.pdf.  
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that ended payday lending in the state.51 Additionally, in 2008, 68% of Ohi-
oans support a ballot initiative that capped interest in the state at 28%.52  
Public opinion survey data shows similar public proclivities in favor of 
interest rate caps. After hearing that payday and title lenders can charge 
500% or more in Texas, 63% of Texans age forty-five or older strongly 
agreed that the state should cap interest rates and fees, with 77% of re-
spondents reporting that the cap should be 36% or less.53 In another survey 
taken by the Texas Fair Lending Alliance,54 and the Texas Faith for Fair 
Lending, 85% of people polled favored capping interest rates on payday 
and auto title loans at 36% APR or less.55 In Iowa, survey data show that 
  
 51. Arizona Payday Loan Reform, Proposition 200 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA (Dec. 3, 
2013, 2:35 PM), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Arizona_Payday_Loan_Reform,_Proposition_200_(20
08) (reporting that voters in Arizona defeated a payday sponsored ballot initiative, mandat-
ing an end to state statutes that allow 400% interest rates). Montana Loan Interest Rate 
Limit, supra note 49. Arizona still allows title loans, however, which now proliferate 
throughout the state. Maureen West, Payday Lenders Morphing into Auto Title Lenders: 
Loophole Allows Interest Rates Up to 204 Percent, AARP BULL. (Dec. 1, 2010),  
http://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-12-
2010/payday_lenders_morphing_into_auto_title_lenders.html.  
 52. Coalition, Raimondo, Taveras Raise Awareness on Payday Lending Pitfalls, 
RI.GOV (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.ri.gov/press/view/16334 (reporting that 76% of Rhode 
Islanders polled support capping payday loan interest rates); Ohio Payday Lender Interest 
Rate Cap, Issue 5 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA (Aug. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM),  
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Ohio_Payday_Lender_Interest_Rate_Cap,_Issue_5_(2
008) (reporting that over 63% of Ohio voters voted in favor of capping the Ohio payday loan 
industry’s interest rate at 28%). 
 53. JENNIFER H. SAUER, AARP, SUMMARY OF AARP POLL OF TEXANS AGE 45+: 
OPINIONS ON PAYDAY LOAN RATES AND LEGISLATION (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/econ/2013/Summary-of-
AARP-Poll-of-Texans-Age-45-Plus-Opinions-on-Payday-Loan-Rates-and-Legislation-
AARP.pdf ;  LBJ SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, CTR. FOR POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE, PAYDAY AND 
AUTO TITLE LENDING, available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/cpg/docs/f3_2013_payday.pdf; 
(summarizing existing Texas law).  
 54. The Texas Fair Lending Alliance is a Texas coalition comprised of almost sixty 
financial, community, and faith organizations dedicated to bringing increased regulation to 
the payday loan industry. TFLA, TEX. FAIR LENDING ALLIANCE, 
http://www.texasfairlending.org/tfla/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
 55. Rudolph Bush, Statewide Survey Shows Broad Support for Payday Lending 
Reform, DALLASNEWS.COM (June 21, 2012), 
http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2012/06/statewide-survey-shows-broad-support-for-
payday-lending-reform.html/ (reporting that 85% of Texans polled favored capping interest 
rates on payday and auto title loans at 36% APR or less); Poll Shows Support for Capping 
Payday Loan Rates and Fees, THE VINDICATOR, (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.thevindicator.com/news/article_2d0406f0-6714-11e2-997e-0019bb2963f4.html. 
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seven in ten Iowans believe payday loan rates and fees should be capped.56 
In Rhode Island, the only state in New England to allow storefront payday 
lending, a public opinion poll showed that 62% of Rhode Islanders support-
ed capping interest on payday loans.57 Finally, a public poll of Coloradans 
showed that 74% of Coloradans support a similar 36% cap.58 
Additionally, support for caps crosses party lines.59 In a recent study I 
conducted with Professor Tim Goldsmith, we set out to measure not just 
overall support for interest rate caps but political affiliation of those who 
favor caps on consumer loans. Our data show widespread support for inter-
est rate caps across political lines. We did find that more Democrats favor 
interest rate caps than Republicans, with 94% of Democrats favoring caps 
and 73% of Republicans favoring caps. What is remarkable, however, is 
just how many very conservative people favor caps. Our data show that 
over 57% of people who report being “very conservative” politically and 
over 82% of those who report being “conservative” politically favor interest 
rate caps over no interest rate caps.60  
While wondering aloud why the public is not more active in seeking 
out laws that cap interest, we stumbled upon a possible explanation. First, 
many people incorrectly think interest rates are capped (over 58% for credit 
cards and over 43% for short-term loans), when in reality these rates are not 
capped.61 In other words, people misunderstand and overestimate the pro-
tection the law currently provides. Second, even among those who know 
that the law provides no caps, most are unaware that lenders in the state in 
which the study was conducted currently charge interest rates of 200% or 
  
 56. Iowans for Payday Loan Reform: Iowa Poll Reveals Strong Bi-partisan Support 
for Payday Lending Reform, IOWAPOLITICS.COM (Jan. 26, 2011) (on file with author) (report-
ing that 7 in 10 Iowans called for capped payday loan interest rates).  
 57. Coalition, Raimondo, Taveras Raise Awareness on Payday Lending Pitfalls, 
supra note 52 (reporting that 76% of Rhode Islanders polled support capping payday loan 
interest rates); CATHOLIC CONFERENCE OF OHIO, 2010 PAYDAY LENDING POLL RESULTS 
(April 29, 2010), http://www.ohiocathconf.org/i/EJ/GraphWork04.pdf. 
 58. Poll on Payday Lending Legislation, CENTER FOR POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
(Feb. 15, 2008) (stating that a weighted sample of 500 Colorado voters found  “74% of 
respondents are in favor of proposed legislation that will set a cap of 36% on the interest and 
fees that a company can charge for payday loans”). A survey of 400 consumers conducted 
and completed in San Jose California showed 63% of voters favored a moratorium on new 
payday loan stores. Payday Lenders Less Popular than Liquor Stores, Majority of Voters 
Would Support Moratorium, According to San Jose Poll, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/Payday-
lenders-less-popular-than-liquor-stores-majority-of-voters-would-support-moratorium-
according-to-San-Jos%C3%A9-poll.html# (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
 59. Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 4, at 128-29. Overall, over 94% of Democrats 
favored interest rate caps, over 73% of Republicans favored caps, and almost 90% of Inde-
pendents favored caps. Id. 
 60. Id. at 129.  
 61. Id. at 124-26. 
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more. Indeed, we found that 81% of the public was unaware of the costs of 
these loans.62 These poll data support the notion that 300% to 1,000% loans 
are not normal or usual.   
IV.     STATE LAW AND HIGH INTEREST CREDIT: A WASTELAND OF 
INEFFICIENCY 
Despite wide and deep public support for rate caps,63 uniform interest 
rate caps that apply to all consumer loan products are few and far between. 
Moreover, those caps that do exist are often ineffective due to state laws’ 
inability to regulate certain lenders, namely those lenders located offshore 
or affiliated with Indian tribes, which provide on-line loans.  
In states where diluted and incomprehensibly complex statutes are 
passed to limit high-interest lending, even storefront lenders find ways 
around those laws by changing the attributes of the loans to avoid the laws, 
fitting within exceptions created by other laws on the books, or becoming 
credit service organizations (“CSOs”), which are exempt from the laws. 
This complex game of whack-a-mole makes regulating state by state an 
expensive yet ineffective endeavor.  
Unfortunately, using the court system to enforce even the trim and un-
diluted laws is similarly ineffective and inefficient. In states with true caps, 
lenders sometimes ignore the caps. This forces consumers and cash-
strapped states that wish to hold lenders to the law to use valuable resources 
to sue the lenders. Additionally, fighting high-interest lenders who violate 
the law in court is inefficient because courts are not in agreement about 
whether existing judicial remedies, such as unconscionability, even apply to 
a product that has not been outlawed by a state legislature. Finally, even 
when courts do find high-cost loans unconscionable, the lender can still rely 
on broad anti-class action and arbitration clauses to avoid liability, and if all 
else fails, file for bankruptcy, thus prolonging the availability of loans that 
violate state laws. All of this demonstrates how the current legislative and 
  
 62. Id. at 128. 
 63. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text. While consumers generally 
support caps, it is unclear whether such caps would affect supply of loans and if so, if cus-
tomers would still support caps if they thought caps might dry up lending for people with 
poor credit. In recent Pew Charitable Trust studies, payday loan borrowers reported prefer-
ence for increased transparency and education rather than loan preclusions. See THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY 
PAYDAY LOANS 43-45 (2013), which follows up on THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY 
LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY (2012). However, 
72% also reported that legal reform was necessary. See id. at 45. Moreover, in our study, 
Tim Goldsmith and I found that people who had taken out payday loans were more likely 
than those who had not to support caps on interest rates. See Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 
4, at 130.  
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judicial landscape is inadequate to meet the public’s expectations about 
how government should regulate.  
A. LEGISLATIVE WASTE 
1. One Form of Loophole: The Long Legislative Battle to Enact a 
Law of No Consequence 
Loopholes happen. In the world of payday lending, they happen a lot. 
For example, payday lenders began appearing in New Mexico after the state 
repealed its General Usury statute (former NMSA 1978 §56-8-11-1) in 
1991.64 For five very long and frustrating years, the New Mexico Legisla-
ture debated various payday lending statutes. Finally, during the legislative 
session of 2007, the Legislature adopted a set of changes to the New Mexi-
co Small Loan Act of 1955 intended to restrict payday lending in New 
Mexico.65 These regulations went into effect in July 2007. The New Mexico 
law is similar to those of several other states in that the regulations rely on a 
computer database enforcement mechanism for consumer qualification and 
reporting.66 In fact, thirty-three states have laws that bear some similarity to 
this new New Mexico law. 67 Yet none of these laws curb payday lending, 
despite legislative goals of curbing high-cost loan abuses.  
The new law capped interest and fees at $15 per $100 for each period 
of fourteen days or less. When taken as an annual percentage rate, calculat-
ed by multiplying this rate by twenty-six two-week periods over the course 
of a year, these terms result in an interest rate of 390% per annum or higher. 
The new law also applied only to lenders engaged in the business of lending 
amounts of $2,500.00 or less68 and defined a loan covered by the Act as one 
of fourteen to thirty-five days in duration, for which the consumer gives the 
lender a check or debit authorization for the amount of the loan plus interest 
and fees. In the end, this narrow definition gutted the legislation. The indus-
try quickly switched to loan products that fall outside the statute, namely 
  
 64. See Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 4, at 578. 
 65. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-1 to -39 (West 2010). 
 66. Other states that have enacted similar statutes and use the same database en-
forcement mechanisms include Florida, Oklahoma, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and North 
Dakota. For a list of state statutes, see Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 4, at 578 n.77. 
 67. See id. at 578 n.78. 
 68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-3(A) (1978). These lenders are required to obtain a 
license from the New Mexico Financial Institutions Division (FID) and to comply with all 
aspects of the Act. However, state level licensing entities (or their authorizing statutes) do 
not actually regulate high cost lending. Most readers and the public might assume that a state 
regulator would take action to curb harmful practices, but pay-day lenders have had to be 
licensed for thirty years in New Mexico and there has been no action by these entities to 
prevent abuse. 
2014] THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL USURY CAP  
 
275 
longer loans or those not involving a post-dated check. This was done so 
that lenders could charge more than 390% per annum. Naturally, these 
loans that fall outside the definition are not regulated at all. Thus, the state 
of New Mexico spent several years attempting to regulate payday lending, 
but the resulting law has done nothing to change short-term lending at high 
interest rates.69  
Ineffective laws, like the New Mexico statute, have been passed in 
various other states around the country. For example, Professor Robert 
Mayer reports on a similar legislative process in Illinois: 
Regulators in Illinois imposed rules in 2001 that 
were designed to [curb the number of payday loans 
and roll-overs]. Customers were allowed to borrow 
no more than $400; only two renewals were per-
mitted, with some of the principal paid down each 
time; and a cooling-off period was mandated to 
prevent borrowers from using the proceeds of a 
new loan to pay off the old one. The state . . . 
promised to establish a database to track loan activ-
ity and enforce the rules.70 
As in New Mexico, Illinois payday lenders quickly devised a new 
product to evade the rules. The statute applied to cash advances with a term 
of less than thirty-one days, so the industry created a thirty-one-day loan 
not covered by the rules.71 As a result, all of the old abuses persist.72 A 2003 
  
 69. New Mexico ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010CV-2009-01916 at 8 
(1st Dist. N.M., Dec. 3, 2010) (on file with author). Moreover, the industry knew it would 
not. Here is what the industry itself says about various legislative efforts, such as those in 
South Carolina: 
We have no complaint that after long debate, the Senate and 
House agreed on a bill to limit borrowers to one payday loan at 
a time, a cap of $550, a cooling off period and the ability of 
payday loan providers to electronically debit their customer’s 
bank account. The implementation of a state-wide data base is 
of little consequence as well.  
Id. The non-interest rate aspects of payday lending legislation have also failed to curb the 
industry or prevent consumers from getting caught in debt traps. For example, the New 
Mexico law provided for an interest-free payment plan as well. Goldsmith & Martin, supra 
note 4, at 580-81. While in brief compliance with the law, some lenders tried to get around 
the interest-free installment plan by telling borrowers that if they used this feature, they 
would be denied future payday loans. Id. 
 70. Robert Mayer, One Payday, Many Payday Loans: Short-Term Lending Abuse in 
Milwaukee County 8 (Loyola Univ. Chi. Political Sci. Dep’t, Working Paper), available at 
http://www.luc.edu/faculty/rmayer/mayer21.pdf (last accessed Aug. 6, 2009).  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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Illinois Division of Financial Institutions report acknowledged that it re-
mains "quite common for borrowers to have multiple payday loans out-
standing with several different payday loan companies."73 Similar end runs 
occurred in Oklahoma. Additionally, other states such as Florida, Illinois, 
and Michigan have tried to impose interest-free payment plans like that 
proposed in New Mexico, but these laws have produced no meaningful 
reduction in the number of trapped borrowers. 
2.    Using Exceptions Created by Other Laws to Get Around Usury 
Other forms of loopholes also abound. In 2008, the Ohio State Legisla-
ture voted to rescind a twelve-year-old law that exempted payday lenders 
from the state’s usury laws, a vote Ohioans supported two to one.74 An ex-
isting short-term loan law purported to cap interest on all short-term loans 
at 28% and also to give customers at least a month to pay off the loans.75 In 
response, lenders simply switched their licenses so they could offer payday 
loan look-alikes under two parallel lending statutes, the Small Loan Act or 
the Mortgage Lending Act.76 Making these changes was simple for lenders, 
and they began offering even higher cost loans, as this industry web site 
explains: 
By adjusting the loan amount to just above $500, 
payday loan lenders double the loan origination 
fees from $15 to $30. The Small Loan and Mort-
gage Lending acts allow the fees on top of the 28 
percent interest, something the new payday lending 
law doesn’t permit. Under the new HB 545 licens-
ing scheme with the check cashing fees added, cus-
tomers pay the same $575 to walk out the door 
with $500 in cash . . . . 
A First American payday loan customer indicated 
he previously paid $75 for a $500 loan, First Amer-
ican charged him a total of $90 to borrow the same 
amount after the law changed. More than one Ohio 
payday loan company has structured their check 
  
 73. Feltner, T., & Williams, M. 2004. "New Terms for Payday Loans: High Cost 
Lenders Change Loan Terms to Evade Illinois Consumer Protections." Woodstock Institute: 
Reinvestment Alert. #26, quoted in Mayer, supra note 70 at 8. 
 74. Ohio Payday Lender Interest Rate Cap, Issue 5 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA (Aug. 8, 
2013, 12:03 PM), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Ohio_Payday_Loan_Referendum_(2008). 
 75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.40 (West 2004) (effective Sept. 1, 2008). 
 76. Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 4, at 591 n.151. 
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cashing and loan operations as two separate entities 
to justify the fees.77 
Then Ohio Attorney General Rich Cordray said his office has found 
payday loans with APR’s ranging from 128% to 700% immediately after 
the ballot initiative that purported to cap interest on consumer loans in Ohio 
at 28%.78  
3.    Credit Service Organizations and Payday Loans 
Another loophole is the credit service organization (CSO). Congress 
and numerous states have enacted CSO legislation in an effort to crack 
down on abuses by companies claiming they could help individuals repair 
their credit.79 These agencies were charging large fees in exchange for pur-
portedly helping consumers clean up poor credit histories and gain access to 
more credit. Most of the services provided turned out to be scams, and 
some agencies even offered to allow people to rent other people’s credit 
scores for fees of $2,000 or more. To curb these abuses, states enacted laws 
prohibiting agencies from charging fees for these types of services, and 
thereafter, Congress enacted the Credit Repair Organization Act.80 
  
 77. Id. As another industry web page explains: 
With news of the passage of Issue 5 in Ohio on Nov. 4, Check 
Into Cash began restructuring its loan product offerings 
throughout the Buckeye state to comply with the new law. On 
Nov. 5, the company ceased to offer payday loans and began 
offering a new product, micro loans, which are short-term 
loans from $50 to $600 and permitted under Ohio's Small 
Loan Act.  
These new micro loans are one way that Check Into Cash is 
striving to continue to serve its valued customers with the 
same level of service as it has in prior years. Even though this 
new Ohio legislation was designed to make it difficult to con-
tinue serving customers who desire payday advance services, 
Check Into Cash has pushed ahead, endeavoring to persevere 
with its ongoing commitment to customer service.  
Check Into Cash Committed to Serving Ohio Customers, PRWEB (Nov. 18, 2008, 10:19 
AM), http://www.prweb.com/releases/checkintocash/ohio/prweb1628414.htm, quoted in 
Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 4, at 591 n.151.  
 78. Sheryl Harris, Payday Lenders Find Legal Loophole That Lets Them Continue 
High-Interest Loans, THE PLAIN DEALER (Feb. 16, 2009, 3:18 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/consumeraffairs/index.ssf/2009/02/payday_loans_are_back_in_a
_new.html. 
 79. See Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 4, at 592-94. 
    80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.12(a)(1)-(3) (West 2008). 
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The definition of CSO in a CSO statute is typically broad,81 allowing 
payday lenders to redefine themselves as CSOs.82 Many lenders did just 
that, meaning that rather than morphing their loan products into another 
form to avoid state laws, they transformed themselves into CSOs in order to 
continue providing the same loans or even more expensive ones.83 CSO 
statutes do not cap interest rates or fees, leaving the door open for payday 
lenders to slip into the definition of a CSO and go back to business as usu-
al.84 Thirty-eight states have state CSO statutes, many of which are used 
regularly to evade other state laws. 85 CSOs are incredibly prolific in Texas, 
as well as in Michigan and Florida.86  
4.    Online Lending 
Internet payday lending is growing quickly and online lenders typical-
ly claim to be immune from state laws. Even where states have won cases 
holding that online lenders must comply with state laws, lenders often fail 
  
 81. Most of these statutes define a CSO as: 
[A] person who, with respect to the extension of credit by oth-
ers, sells, provides, or performs, or represents that he or she 
can or will sell, provide or perform, any of the following ser-
vices, in return for the payment of money or other valuable 
consideration: 
(1) Improving a buyer's credit record, history, or rating. 
(2) Obtaining a loan or other extension of credit for a  
buyer. 
(3) Providing advice or assistance to a buyer with regard to 
either paragraph (1) or (2).  
Id. 
 82. See Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and 
Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 962 (2008). 
 83. Here is how one payday loan web site describes the CSO loophole: 
If you’re not familiar with the CSO payday loan model it es-
sentially consists of a “servicer” that markets the product, ser-
vices the product, and accepts the risks associated with the 
product by issuing a “letter of credit” on behalf of the “bor-
rower” to a “lender”. A Credit Services Organization typically 
charges the consumer $20 - $30 per $100 loaned for 7 to 31 
days. The CSO Credit Services Organization is “registered” 
with the state rather than “licensed” by the state. The state 
does not “regulate” the CSO. 
Florida Payday Loan Credit Services Organization Issues, PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY BLOG 
(June 17, 2008), http://paydayloanindustryblog.com/florida-payday-loan-credit-services-
organization-issues. 
 84. Spector, supra note 82, at 988. 
 85. See Goldsmith & Martin supra note 4, at 592 n.154. 
 86. See Id. at 594-95.   
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to do so.87 State regulators have again garnered precious resources to en-
force their laws, often to no avail. For example, Colorado and West Virgin-
ia have been particularly active at fighting online attempts to skirt state 
laws.88 The most recent survey by the Consumer Federation of America 
(CFA) notes that lenders continue to claim choice of law from lax jurisdic-
tions, to locate offshore, or to claim tribal sovereign immunity to avoid 
complying with state consumer protections. 89 
The tribal sovereign immunity loophole is particularly damaging, as it 
pits two traditionally disadvantaged groups, Native Americans and low-
income consumers, against one another in a complex battle over who needs 
protection more.90 Under this model, lenders team up with Indian tribes to 
avoid state laws. Tribes engaged in off-reservation activities must comply 
with non-discriminatory state laws, as must anybody else.91 Despite this 
requirement, tribes are immune from suit because they are separate sover-
  
 87. See JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., INTERNET 
PAYDAY LENDING: HOW HIGH-PRICED LENDERS USE THE INTERNET TO MIRE BORROWERS IN 
DEBT AND EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 7-12, 22 (2004),  available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/Internet_Payday_
Lending113004.PDF (discussing the costs of internet payday loans). 
 88. See Press Release, West Virginia Attorney General’s Office (Aug. 24, 2012) (on 
file with author); Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwatrz, The Alliance Between Payday Lend-
ers and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk? 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 751, 779-80 (2012) (describing a case brought against alleged tribal lenders by 
the Colorado Attorney General’s Office); Heather L. Petrovich, Circumventing State Con-
sumer Protection Laws: Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Internet Payday Lending, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 326, 342 (2012). Colorado regulators are also very active. See Attorney General An-
nounces 2011 Annual Lending Data Report, COLO. DEP’T OF L. (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/press/news/2012/10/01/attorney_general_announce
s_2011_annual_lending_data_report. The Attorney General also has issued press releases 
announcing settlements involving online payday lending. See, e.g., Press Release, Colo. 
Dep’t of Law, Attorney General Suthers Announces $2 Million Settlement with Internet 
“Payday” Lender (Dec. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/press/news/2005/12/23/attorney_general_suthers_a
nnounces_2_million_settlement_internet_%E2%80%9Cpayday%E2%80%9D_lend and 
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/press/news/2008/03/13/attorney_general_suthers_a
nnounces_payday_lending_settlement. See also Colorado v. W. Sky Fin., L.L.C., 845 F. 
Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Colo. 2011). 
 89. See FOX & PETRINI, supra note 87, at 4. While it is true that even federal laws do 
not necessarily stop offshore lenders, the federal government has more enforcement power 
so a federal interest rate cap could make it easier to regulate offshore entities.  
 90. See, e.g., Bree R. Black Horse, The Risks and Benefits of Tribal Payday Lending 
to Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 1 AM. INDIAN L. J. 388 (2013); Adam Mayle, Note, Usury on 
the Reservation, 31 REV. OF BANKING AND FIN. L. 1054 (2012); Martin & Schwartz, supra 
note 88; Heather L. Petrovich, Comment, Circumventing State Consumer Protection Laws: 
Tribal Immunity and Internet Payday Lending, 91 N.C. L. REV. 326 (2012).  
 91. Colorado ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance, 205 P.3d 389 (Colo. App. 2008), 
aff’d, 242 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2010). 
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eigns.92 Thus, while they must obey state laws, they cannot be sued to en-
force the laws or compel their compliance. This motivates lenders to seek 
out tribal partners, as this industry web site explains: 
Due to the strict regulations that are hitting the 
payday loan industry hard, many lenders are now 
turning to Indian Tribes to help them out. The 
American Indian Tribes throughout the United 
States have been granted sovereign immunity 
which means that they are not held subject to the 
laws that payday loans are currently going up 
against. There are 12 states which have banned 
payday lending but as long as their [sic] is an Indi-
an tribe who runs the operation on this sovereign 
land, the lenders can continue their business even 
where payday loans have already been banned. 
Similar to the Casino boom, payday loans are the 
new financial strategy that many are using as a 
loophole through the strict payday loan laws. The 
revenue is quite high and promising for these tribes 
who often find themselves struggling. There are 
approximately 35 online cash advance and payday 
loan companies that are owned by American Indian 
tribes. Consumers have taken out approximately 
12,500 loans over the last year in which these 
tribes made approximately $420 million. It is no 
surprise that many lending companies are currently 
seeking out American Indian Tribes in an effort to 
save their businesses by escaping US lending laws. 
Tribal leaders are paid a few thousand dollars a 
month for allowing a payday lender to incorporate 
on tribal land. The more lenders that tribes allow to 
move onto their reservation, the larger the profit 
that they make.93 
Often, as this excerpt clearly articulates, the lenders using this model 
are not tribes. Proving that the lenders are not entitled to tribal sovereign 
immunity is not easy, however. A trim federal interest rate cap would elim-
inate this loophole, as even tribes are bound by federal law. 
  
 92. Id. 
 93. The Connection Between Indian Tribes and Payday Lending, ONLINE CASH 
ADVANCE (on file with the author). 
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5.    Colorado: An Example of a State Consumer Lending Law That 
Works, but at What Cost? 
Despite all of the failures described above, states can sometimes curb 
high-cost loan abuses. Doing so, however, is costly and takes deep dedica-
tion. As an example of a state law that has worked at least to some extent, 
Colorado passed a state law in 2010 that has drastically reduced the number 
of payday loans in the state as well as the interest rates on existing payday 
loans.94 The law sets a maximum loan amount at $500 and adds provisions 
designed to keep consumers from getting trapped in the usual payday loan 
rollover cycle.95 Consumers also have the right to cancel a payday loan 
transaction by 5:00 p.m. the following day.96
 
Consumers may also choose to 
repay loans in one sum or pay the full amount over six months.97
 
The law 
also caps interest rates for these loans at 45%,98
 
but this rate limit does not 
include fees and other costs, which add significantly to the actual cost of the 
loans.99
 
A recent study completed by the Pew Charitable Trust concludes that 
this new law has been effective in reducing rates on payday loans.100 In-
deed, the dollar amounts of payday loans in Colorado have fallen almost 
60%, and the number of loans fell from 1,110,224 loans in 2010 to 444,333 
in 2011 after the law was implemented.101 Data from the Colorado Attorney 
General’s office indicate that the new law appears to have dropped average 
effective APRs from 338.90% to 191.54%.102 In addition, quite significant-
  
 94. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-101 to 5-3.1-123 (2010).  
 95. Id. § 5-1.3-106(2). 
 96. See Schmitz, supra note 6, at 98 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1.3-106(2)). 
 97. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-101-106. 
 98. Id. § 5-3.1-105. 
 99. See Schmitz, supra note 6, at 98. See also D a v i d  C a l l a h a n ,  P e w ' s  
A p p a l l i n g  T h u m b s  U p  f o r  P a y d a y  L o a n s  W i t h  1 2 9 %  A n n u a l  
I n t e r e s t ,  P O L I C Y S H O P  ( O c t .  3 1 ,  2 0 1 3 ) ,  
http://www.demos.org/blog/10/31/13/pews-appalling-thumbs-payday-loans-129-annual-
interest. 
     100.  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: POLICY 
SOLUTIONS, REPORT 3 12-13 (2013), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2013/Pew_Payday_Policy_Solutions_
Oct_2013.pdf. 
 101. See Press Release, Colo. Dep’t of Law, Attorney General Announces 2011 
Annual Lending Data Report (Oct. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/press/news/2012/10/01/attorney_general_announce
s_2011_annual_lending_data_report (last visited June 9, 2013), cited in Schmitz, supra note 
6, at 99. 
 102. ADM’R OF THE COLO. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, COLORADO PAYDAY 
LENDING DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION: JULY 2000 THROUGH DECEMBER 
2011 (2012), available at 
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/uccc/annual_reports/De
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ly, the average number of payday loans consumers have taken out per year 
has fallen from 8.53 loans per person to 2.3 loans per person.103 
Nonetheless, the average contract finance charge has risen significant-
ly, from $60 to $237,104 and some commentators are appalled at the fact that 
when fees and costs are included, the Colorado law allows interest rates of 
up to 129%.105 There also has been an increase in “same-day-as-payoff” 
transactions, meaning the lender makes a new loan to a consumer on the 
same day the consumer pays their previous loan in full.106 This allows the 
lender to easily get around attempts to limit rollovers. In summary, Colora-
do has been more vigilant than any other state in working on a solution to 
the payday lending problem, other than an interest rate cap. The law it 
passed, while better than what many other states have come up with, still 
has many problems. Moreover, few states have the will or the resources to 
go to the efforts to which Colorado has, making a federal solution to the 
problem efficient and effective by comparison. Congress has regularly and 
effectively taken over areas of consumer and commercial law107 and should 
do so here as well.  
B.    JUDICIAL WASTE 
One possible solution to the persistence of high-cost loans is to attempt 
to use courts to invalidate the loans. I purposely use the word “attempt” 
because, once again, the loans and their makers seem impervious to effec-
tive state regulation. Some of the limitations of these judicial efforts are 
outlined below. 
  
mo%20%26%20Stat%20Info%202000-2011.pdf [hereinafter 2011 CO REPORT], quoted in 
Schmitz, supra note 6, at 99. 
 103. Id.; Attorney General Announces 2011 Annual Lending Data Report, supra note 
101.  
 104. Attorney General Announces 2011 Annual Lending Data Report, supra note 
101.  
 105. David Callahan, Pew's Appalling Thumbs Up for Payday Loans With 129% 
Annual Interest, POLICYSHOP (Oct. 31, 2013),  http://www.demos.org/blog/10/31/13/pews-
appalling-thumbs-payday-loans-129-annual-interest. 
 106. Schmitz, supra note 6, at 99. 
 107. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012); Truth in Lending 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2012); Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-
1693r (2012). 
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1. High Cost Loans and Common Law Doctrine of                     
Unconscionability 
One possibility is to ask courts to use the common law doctrine of un-
conscionability to invalidate high-cost loans.108 The doctrine of uncon-
scionability gives courts the inherent power to decline to enforce a contract 
that is one sided or unfair to one party, either in whole or in part.109 Courts 
can use the doctrine to strike down specific contract terms or entire con-
tracts if the contracts or specific terms shock the conscience and are the 
product of a flawed bargaining procedure.110  
  
 108. The topic is popular with scholars if not useful to courts and consumers. See 
generally Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconcionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 73 (2006); Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and 
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123 (2005-2006); Horacio Spector, A Contractarian Ap-
proach to Unconscionabilty, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 95 (2006); Philip Bridwell, The Philo-
sophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (2003); 
Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. (2001-2002); 
Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 20 HOUS. L. REV. 1819 (1993-1994); 
Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The 
Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Uncon-
scionability Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721 (1994-1995); Jeffery C. Fort, Understanding 
Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 765 (1977-1978); Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of 
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008); Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis 
Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2005-2006); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A 
Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the 
Freedom to Contract, 224 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability 
and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1969-
1970). 
 109. See Charles Knapp, Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-
First Century Survey (University of Hastings College of Law, Legal Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 71, 2013)) available at pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346498. 
 110. Elizabeth Warren & OrenBar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
71 (2008). This article states that: 
Consumer credit transactions are regulated by the general law 
of contracts. The main doctrinal vehicle for policing these 
transactions is the unconscionability doctrine . . . . Uncon-
scionability review is most commonly applied to contracts be-
tween consumers and sophisticated corporations, and it has 
been used to police credit contracts. Yet courts have been very 
circumspect in applying unconscionability review to credit 
contracts. As explained below, the reluctance of common law 
judges to intervene in credit transactions is justified by institu-
tional, doctrinal, and procedural considerations. Moreover, 
with respect to interest rates and possibly other contractual 
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Despite this broad power, courts rarely use the doctrine. Judging by 
courts’ scant modern use of this doctrine, one might assume that sharp, one-
sided practices typical of unconscionable contracts must be on the de-
cline.111 In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. Compared to the 
time at which Ms. Williams, from the iconic Williams v. Walker Furni-
ture,112 case first signed a contract containing an unconscionable cross-
collateralization clause, expensive and one-sided loan transactions have 
proliferated. While at least two scholars have suggested that unconsciona-
bility can play a critical role in policing payday and title lending interest 
rates and fees,113 courts have been slow to use the doctrine to invalidate 
consumer loans.114  
Perhaps courts use the doctrine infrequently because it is seen as 
messy, imprecise, and paternalistic. Applying the unconscionability doc-
trine to invalidate consumer loans also flies in the face of arguably more 
important contracts rules, namely that people are bound by the contracts 
they sign and also have a duty to read these contracts before they do sign 
them. Moreover, most consumers are likely unaware of the doctrine or of 
their right to challenge unfair contracts. Most probably assume they could 
not win a lawsuit against a big corporation. Perhaps they are right.  
  
provisions that form the centerpiece of credit contracts, uncon-
scionability review is likely preempted by federal law. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 111. Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Research 
Paper No. 11-97 (2011)), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885079 (concluding that we have 
moved away from making moral or empathetic decisions, or even value judgments in the 
law, in favor of leaving people responsible for their own choices even if they are deceived).  
 112. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 113. William M. Woodyard & Chad M. Marzen, Is Greed Good: A Catholic Per-
spective on Modern Usury, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 185, 220 (2012). 
 114. One context in which the doctrine is used regularly is in finding arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts to be unenforceable. See Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 163 
F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194-95 (S.D. Cal. 2001)) (finding that a credit card contract's arbitration 
clause was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable), cited in Warren & Bar-
Gil, supra note 110, at 71; Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830-36 (S.D. 
Mass. 2001) (ruling against unconscionability even where an arbitration clause required 
plaintiff to bear arbitration fees and restricted available remedies); Marsh v. First USA Bank, 
N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 920 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the arbitration was not un-
conscionable though the clause was not bargained for). Such claims have been upheld, but 
only in extreme cases. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 785 
(9th Cir. 2002) (showing that an arbitration clause that exempts drafters’ claims is most 
likely to be unconscionable); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 
1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“[A]n arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable be-
cause it waives class remedies, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.”). See also Rus-
sell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1274-75 (2003) (discussing arbitration-clause unconscionability cas-
es). 
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i.     History of Unconscionability 
Unconscionability was part of the common law of contract as early as 
the 1800’s but became more well-recognized after 1947 in Campbell Soup 
Co. v. Wentz.115 In this case, two farmers agreed to sell all of their red cored 
carrots to Campbell’s Soup Co. under terms that allowed the soup giant to 
reject all the carrots for any or no reason and that set very low liquidated 
damages for Campbell’s breach.116 This decision recognized an element of 
oppression in the unconscionability doctrine.117  
Later, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.118 the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals found that a contract between an impoverished, 
uneducated, woman and a seller of household goods could be unconsciona-
ble when the contract’s fine print allowed the company to spread all re-
maining debt for one new item over all items purchased over the prior five 
years, essentially cross collateralizing the obligation and allowing the com-
pany to repossess all the items previously purchased and paid for, if the 
customer missed one payment on the new item.119 In other words, no furni-
ture was paid off until all of it was. Since the facts were not fully developed 
below, the court remanded the case back to trial and, in so doing, noted that 
unconscionability includes an absence of meaningful choice, which can be 
shown by a gross inequality of bargaining power on the part of one of the 
parties, together with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party.120 The Williams court also discussed the relevance of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the contract, such as whether the less powerful 
party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract 
or whether, instead, important contract terms were hidden in a maze of fine 
print and minimized by deceptive sales practices.121 Thus, the Williams 
court clarified that, while most contracts are enforceable, when a party with 
little or no bargaining power and thus no practical choice enters into a one-
sided contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, there is no realistic 
consent to the terms. Rather, the usual rule that the terms of the agreement 
are enforceable should be abandoned, and the court should consider wheth-
  
 115. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d. 80 (3d Cir. 1948).  
 116. Id. at 81.  
 117. Id. at 83-84. 
 118. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 119. Id. at 447. 
 120. Id. at 449. 
 121. Id. See also Ohio Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Smith, 724 N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1999) (quoting Williams, 350 F.2d at 449); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 313 
F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003).  
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er the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be with-
held.122 
The Uniform Commercial Code codified the unconscionability doc-
trine when it was enacted in 1952, making the doctrine part of both statuto-
ry and common law. Not long afterwards, Yale law professor Arthur Leff, a 
vehement opponent of the doctrine, wrote an article claiming that in order 
for a court to use unconscionability to invalidate contract terms the court 
must find both procedural and substantive unconscionability.123 While 
courts have not always been consistent in interpreting this distinction, pro-
cedural usually means unfairness in the formation of the contract and sub-
stantive usually means unfairness in the terms in the contract itself.124 Sub-
stantive issues include one-sided terms, and procedural issues include a 
party's lack of choice, superior bargaining position or knowledge, and other 
circumstances surrounding the bargaining process.125 
ii.     Today’s Law of Unconscionability 
In considering whether to apply the doctrine today, courts typically 
look at the terms of the contract to determine if one party to the contract 
took advantage of its superior bargaining power so that the contract over-
whelmingly favors the interests of that party. The doctrine is extremely 
flexible, which is part of its problem.126 Today courts are split as to whether 
  
 122. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. 
 123. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-88 (1967).  
 124. See Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 261-62 
(W. Va. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass'n, N.D., 693 N.W.2d 918, 923 (N.D. 2005). 
 125. Brown, 724 S.E.2d at 261-62; Strand, 693 N.W. 2d at 923. 
 126. Christopher Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the De-
regulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2005). Peterson notes that: 
In addition to usury law, state and local governments have 
passed other contract restrictive consumer credit protections 
such as caps on late fees or even the amount of points charge-
able. Another more important example of contractual limita-
tion policy in the United States is unconscionability law. 
Where rate, fee, and point caps set an inflexible, yet somewhat 
artificially contrived, bright line price limit, the unconsciona-
bility doctrine sets a loose post hoc judicial standard against 
unfair loans. The unconscionability doctrine dates at least back 
to the Roman doctrine of laesio enormis, also called the fair 
exchange doctrine, which invalidated grossly unfair contracts. 
Some have suggested unconscionability may have been im-
ported into the common law tradition specifically as a re-
sponse to high interest rates. Traditionally courts gave import 
to the unconscionability doctrine by denying relief to parties 
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you need both procedural and substantive unconscionably to invalidate con-
tract terms.127 Determining whether a contract is one of adhesion is not re-
quired before proceeding with an unconscionability analysis.128 However, 
some courts incorporate the analysis of adhesion into the procedural analy-
sis.129  
  
guilty of unconscionable conduct. The doctrine currently ap-
pears in the Uniform Commercial Code Article II, the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, and some consumer credit 
statutes.  
Id. As Peterson notes, most courts now follow the influential analysis of Professor Arthur 
Leff delineating two types of unconscionability: procedural and substantive; and, while all 
“courts typically require ‘some quantum of both procedural and substantive unconscionabil-
ity to establish a claim,” some do not. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58-59 
(Ariz. 1995), quoted in Christopher Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmask-
ing the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2005). For example, “[i]n Max-
well v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., a door-to-door salesmen sold a hotel maid a solar 
water heater financed by a 19.5% loan secured by not only the water heater but also her 
modest home.” Id.; Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 58-59 (“[W]e conclude that under A.R.S. § 47-
2302, a claim of unconscionability can be established with a showing of substantive uncon-
scionability alone, especially in cases involving either price-cost disparity or limitation of 
remedies.”). Even though the water heater was improperly installed and never actually 
worked, the borrower made payments on this and a related loan for six years until she sued 
for a declaratory judgment that the original contract was unenforceable for unconscionabil-
ity. Id. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that “[t]he apparent injustice and oppression” 
presented a triable issue of unconscionability even absent a finding of procedural uncon-
scionability. Id. at 60. See also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (1988) (describing interest rate caps and fee limits as “crystals” 
and unconscionability as “mud”). 
 127. New Mexico courts hold that you need one or the other, not both. See, e.g., 
Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 817 (N.M. 2011) (noting “the substan-
tive unconscionability of the one-sided contract provisions was ‘so compelling’” that ad-
dressing procedural unconscionability was unnecessary). See also Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 58. 
 128. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract form that offers goods or ser-
vices to consumers on essentially a “take it or leave it” basis without giving consumers real-
istic opportunities to negotiate terms that would benefit their interests. When this occurs, the 
consumer cannot obtain the desired product or service unless he or she acquiesces to the 
form contract. Adhesion Contract, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Adhesion+Contract (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). See Cordova 
v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 910 (N.M. 2009). See also Rivera, 259 P.2d at 
817; Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 678 (N.M. 1985) (laying out the elements 
of an adhesive contract).  
 129. Cordova, 208 P.2d at 910-11. Rivera noted that “[a]dhesion contracts generally 
warrant heightened judicial scrutiny because the drafting party is in a superior bargaining 
position.” Rivera, 259 P.3d at 817. Rivera formally reversed a court of appeals opinion ap-
plying the unconscionability standard from Cordova. Id. at 819. The New Mexico Supreme 
Court did so because they felt the court of appeals had misapplied the central holding of 
Cordova, and the court was concerned that an arbitrator might otherwise apply erroneous 
precedent. Id. at 816. Adhesion is not synonymous with unconscionability; instead, when 
“the terms are patently unfair to the weaker party” there is procedural unconscionability. Id. 
at 817 (quoting Cordova, 208 P.3d at 910).  
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iii.     Unconscionability and Consumer Lending 
Though one commentator claims that the use of the doctrine may be 
on the upswing,130 cases in which unconscionability has been applied to 
consumer loans are few and far between. One example is Carboni v. Arro-
spide,131 in which the court found that an interest rate of 200% on a secured 
loan of $99,000 was substantively unconscionable because the cost to the 
borrower was “overly harsh” and “not justified by the circumstances.”132 In 
Carboni, the “‘price’ of the credit” was found to be approximately ten times 
the value of the loan because the interest rate was ten times the prevailing 
rate for the same type of loan.133 In making its decision, Carboni relied on 
decisions in which the price to value ratio was one to three to one to four.134 
However, the price to value ratio was not dispositive; rather, the linchpin 
was the lack of justification for the ratio.135 Carboni notes that a one-sided 
term or result might be justified, but without such justification, a one-sided 
term is likely unconscionable.136  
What might be the justification for the current payday and title loan 
rates of twenty to seventy-five times the prevailing rate? That people need 
money and this is the only way to get it? Lenders would need to prove this 
need, which may not be as easy as one might assume.137 In Carboni, the 
lender argued that a more “conventional” loan would have an interest rate at 
about 18% to 21% plus costs. The lender further argued that the debt could 
have been paid off early, thereby avoiding much of the ballooning inter-
est.138 Both arguments failed and the trial court adjusted the rate in the case 
to 24%, which was affirmed.139  
  
 130. Knapp, supra note 109, at 17. 
 131. Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. App. 4th 76, 83-84 ( 1991). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. (citing Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969); Frostifresh 
Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966)). 
 135. Id., 2 Cal. App. 4th at 84. Some aspects of the facts seem to go more to proce-
dural unconscionability, showing that courts have trouble making this substantive/procedural 
distinction.  
 136. Carboni, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 84. 
 137. In any case, it is possible that the need that payday loans fill is a need created by 
payday borrowing itself, which creates a debt cycle and makes it less likely that consumers 
will be able to pay other bills, because they now have a 500% or 1,000% loan to pay every 
two weeks or month. Deena Reynolds, Note, A Look at Payday Loans and Current Regula-
tion in Texas, 8 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 321, 325-26 (2007). 
 138. Carboni, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 84.  
 139. Id. at 87. 
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iv.     Unconscionability and High-Cost Loans 
In the particular context of high-cost loans, courts of at least four states 
have recently considered whether high-cost loans are unconscionable. In 
Johnson v. Cash Store,140 a woman entered into a series of payday loans 
through which she paid back double her $500 loan, lost her trailer residence 
to foreclosure, and owed a deficiency of $20,000 to her lender. Suing under 
an unconscionability provision in the state’s consumer protection law, she 
obtained a default judgment with treble damages, plus $15,000 in emotional 
distress damages, which the state court refused to vacate.141 The court was 
not convinced by the argument that because the state financial institutions 
division had licensed the lenders, the loans could not be unconscionable.142 
This is fortunate, given the utter failure of state level licensing entities (or 
their authorizing statutes) to regulate high cost lending in any way. Addi-
tionally, in Wisconsin, a loan with an APR of over 1,000% was deemed 
substantively unconscionable, despite the fact that the state had imposed no 
interest rate cap through legislation.143 In California, a court certified a class 
for a class action in a payday loan case involving claims for excessive in-
terest and fees, oppressive collection efforts, and various other allegedly 
illegal practices.144 
Two recent New Mexico cases, however, demonstrate how uncon-
scionability fails to provide what only federal legislation can—namely con-
sistency and predictability. In King v. B&B Investment Group, Inc., Cash 
Loans Now made signature loans ranging in amount from $50 to $300 at an 
APR ranging of 1147% to more than 1500%.145 These loans were amortized 
over a year long repayment term. If paid in full under the terms of the loan, 
the borrowers paid ten to fifteen times what they borrowed over the course 
of a year. For example, consumer Mr. Welito borrowed $100 and paid back 
$1,099.71, and Ms. Charley borrowed $200 and paid back $2,360.04.146 A 
suit brought by the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office (NMAG) 
claimed that the price of the credit was unconscionable on its face, as a mat-
ter of public policy.147 While the NMAG did not ask the court to determine 
what a reasonable amount of interest would be under the circumstances, the 
  
 140. Johnson v. Cash Store, 68 P.3d 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
 141. Id. at 1106.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Payday Loan Stores of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Mount, 2011 WL 2577365 (Wis. Ct. 
App 2010), cert. granted, 804 N.W.2d 82 (2011). 
 144. O’Donovan v. CashCall, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 479 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 145. New Mexico ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010CV-2009-01916 1, 
1-2 (1st Dist. N.M. Dec. 3, 2010) (on file with author). 
 146. Id. at 1-2. 
 147. Id. at 23. 
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court was asked to hold that these amounts were unconscionable on their 
face.148 
In addition to causing the borrowers to pay back ten to fifteen times 
what they borrowed, Cash Loans Now did not disclose the total costs of 
these loans to their patrons149 and also regularly contacted borrowers to try 
to get them to borrow more,150 collectively causing the trial court to find 
procedural unconscionability in the case. The trial court found that Cash 
Loans Now borrowers were less educated than the general population, were 
likely to come from minorities, and suffered from optimism bias, temporal 
biases, and framing biases, particularly given that the loans were often de-
scribed to consumers in terms of a small daily cost.151 Moreover, the court 
found that the lender’s stated policy, of calling all active files regularly to 
get the people to increase the principal or let people know they can re-
borrow, exploited customer optimism.152 The trial court also found the in-
stallment contracts to be contracts of adhesion153 and that the borrowers’ 
various cognitive biases impaired their understanding of how the loans 
worked, as well as borrowers’ understanding of their ability to pay back the 
loans. 154 The trial court also found that these APRs—of over 1000%—were 
“shocking.”155 Thus the court found procedural unconscionability but not 
substantive unconscionability, and held a second trial to set damages.156  
At the second trial, however, the trial court allowed no recovery in the 
case.157 The trial court found that there was no great disparity between what 
the borrowers received and what they got.158 Tellingly, in the first opinion, 
the trial court did not find it to be its place to find substantive unconsciona-
bility, yet it found all of the elements of substantive unconscionability. It 
refused to declare an interest rate of 1,000% to be unconscionable, despite 
that the unconscionability doctrine is available only to courts and that these 
rates can hardly be conscionable by any standards.159  
  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 18. 
 150. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010CV-2009-01916 at 18.  
  151.  Id. at 3-6, 17. For example, if the cost of a loan is framed as something low, the 
borrower's expectations can be anchored in that perception, making it difficult for him or her 
to reassess the true cost and risk of the loan once they get additional information. Id. at 16. 
 152. Id. at 18. 
 153. Id. at 19. 
 154. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010CV-2009-01916 at 19. 
 155. Id. at 19.  
      156.  Id. at 23. 
   157.     New Mexico ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-101-CV-2009-01916 1, 20-
21 (Dec. 8, 2011) [hereinafter B & B Second Opinion] (on file with author).  
 158. Id. 
 159. The court also found that it would be too harsh a penalty to force defendants out 
of business in New Mexico despite the fact that very few places in this country welcome 
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In other words, the court found that it was not its place to use the un-
conscionability doctrine to invalidate the loans. The court claimed that it 
was the place of the legislature to set the rate and that the legislature had 
not done so for this type of loan. The court found no substantive uncon-
scionability, no recovery for mere procedural unconscionability,160 and that 
there was no law against these loans on the books, despite the fact that pay-
day loan laws existed for a similar product and capped interest at a rate 
lower than what Cash Loans Now was charging.  
Scholars have clearly articulated that it is the place of courts to police 
these transactions and that courts unquestionably have that right if there is 
no law on the books to the contrary.161 This understanding is completely 
consistent with the history, development, and policies behind the doctrine 
of unconscionability. Despite that it is clearly the role of courts to use the 
doctrine in precisely this way, courts do not always do so.  
Then again, sometimes they do, as evidenced by the results in King v. 
FastBucks Holding Corp., a similar case in the same state.162 In King v. 
FastBucks, the court found that borrowers who used FastBucks products, 
mostly installment-style loans following the changes in law in New Mexico 
in 2007, were less educated and had lower incomes than average.163 The 
borrowers also were found to not know the difference between payday 
loans and installment loans, which is no wonder since these differences 
were never disclosed to them.164 The court further found that FastBucks 
took advantage of borrowers’ lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or 
capacity to a grossly unfair degree by deliberatively steering borrowers into 
loans that subjected them to higher interest rates and kept them locked into 
recurring cycles of debt.165 The court further found that FastBucks inten-
tionally steered customers to the most expensive products it offered in order 
to increase profits and provided incentives to employees who did so. As the 
court stated: 
  
these loans, and in many states, they have been put out of businesses or never got into busi-
ness in the first place. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010CV-2009-01916, at 19. 
 160. There was a separate trial for damages, and the court found none on the theory 
that there was no need to provide restitution to borrowers, because the Plaintiffs did not 
properly offset their request for damages by the intangible “value” borrowers received from 
being able to borrow from Cash Loans Now, and also that any restitution award short of the 
requested amount would be arbitrary. B & B Second Opinion, No. D-101-CV-2009-01916 at 
20-21. 
 161. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.12(a)(1)-(3) (West 2008).  
 162. See New Mexico v. Fastbucks Holding Corp., No. D0101-CV-2009-01917 
(N.M. Sept. 26, 2012). 
 163. Id. at 2. 
 164. Id. at 4. 
 165. Id. 
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Rose Figeroa testified that “[w]e just don’t let any-
body pay off,” and that “[w]e tell them how their 
tax refund is better used at Wal-Mart . . . than at 
FastBucks, and we basically talk them into making 
a payment and continuing to be our customer.” She 
was congratulated  for her approach and used as an 
example for how other employees of [FastBucks] 
could conduct themselves to earn the conspicuous 
financial rewards that were imparted upon her.166 
The court further found that FastBucks encouraged customers to use 
one loan to pay off another and that the customer’s lack of knowledge, 
combined with the superior knowledge of FastBucks, the smooth sales talk, 
and the explicit desire to steer customers away from 400% payday loans 
and into 520-650% installment-style loans, took advantage of customers’ 
lack of knowledge and the intricacies of the loans to a grossly unfair de-
gree.167 Noting that one customer paid $4,680.48 for an $800 installment 
loan, the court found a pattern of “manufacturing exorbitantly expensive 
repayment obligations through their use of installment loan products.”168 
The court further found that FastBucks knew that customers would be una-
ble to pay back these loans. This fact, along with FastBucks’s obvious at-
tempt to get around existing law, constituted unconscionable lending prac-
tices under New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act.169 The court ordered resti-
tution in an unliquidated amount, estimated by the New Mexico Attorney 
General’s Office at over $20 million.170 This victory, however, would also 
prove empty, at least in the short term, as the next section explains. 
2. The Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Option: More Evidence of State 
Court Impotence 
Naturally, lender bankruptcies cause further delays. As an example, 
three months after the NMAG’s Office obtained a judgment against Fast-
Bucks estimated at $20 million,171 FastBucks filed for Chapter 11 bankrupt-
  
 166. Id. at 3.  
 167. Fastbucks Holding Corp., No. D0101-CV-2009-01917 at 4. 
 168. Id. at 5. 
 169. Id. at 5-6. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §57-12-2.E(1)-(2) (2009). 
 170. See Press Release, Attorney General’s Office, AG: FastBucks Pulls Fast One on 
NM Consumers: Predatory Loan Practices Continue Despite Court Order (Jan. 28, 2013) (on 
file with author) 
 171. Because of FastBucks’s Bankruptcy, the judgment was never actually liquidat-
ed. Unsworn declaration of Charles A. Horton in Support of Emergency Motions at 4, In re 
Fastbucks Holdings Corp., No. 12-37793-11 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Horton 
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cy protection.172 The automatic stay imposed by section 362 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code stopped the NMAG’s collection efforts, at least for a while, 
and allowed FastBucks to further strategize about how to avoid the implica-
tions of this potentially large judgment.173 FastBucks’s bankruptcy case 
obviously delayed the enforcement of the judgment.  
The required Chapter 11 disclosures and various motions in the case 
also provide further evidence of the inefficiency of the current high-cost 
lending regulatory structure. In its initial filings with the courts, FastBucks 
claimed it exists because of a lack of credit to credit-challenged consumers, 
who were essentially abandoned by traditional banks.174  It also claimed 
that following banks’ abandonment of these consumers, loans to this sector 
have grown to a $45 billion industry, when considering “both brick and 
mortar branches and online lenders.”175  
These initial disclosures also clarify that FastBucks had never been 
late on any of its obligations and that the primary reason for the bankruptcy 
filing was the NMAG’s Office judgment.176 FastBucks also disclosed that it 
generated $16.4 million in revenues in 2011, through the operation of sixty 
  
Declaration]. A previous blog had described the state court litigation in New Mexico that led 
to the filing of FastBucks bankruptcy:  
The post described how the court found that FastBucks em-
ployees encouraged borrowers to not pay off loans, which 
loans were found to violate state law. We in New Mexico, 
where the case was brought, watched to see if the FaskBucks 
shops would close down, but they never did. Rather, Fast-
Bucks filed some motions and an appeal in state court, then 
filed for Chapter 11 on December 10, 2012. Their largest cred-
itor? The State of New Mexico. 
Nathalie Martin, Interesting Automatic Stay Decision in FastBucks Chapter 11 Case, CREDIT 
SLIPS (Apr. 9, 2013 11:44 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/payday_lending/. 
 172. FastBucks Bankruptcy Petition, In re Fastbucks Holdings Corp.,No. 12-37793-
11 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/payday_lending/. The parties that filed included Fast-
Bucks Holding Corporation, FastBucks, Inc., FastBucks Wage and Benefits, LLC, Fast-
Bucks of Alamogordo, New Mexico, LLC, FastBucks of Gallup, New Mexico, LLC, Fast-
Bucks of Rio Rancho, New Mexico, LLC, FastBucks of Las Vegas, New Mexico, LLC, and 
FastBucks of Roswell, New Mexico, LLC (collectively, “FastBucks” or “the Debtors”). 
 173. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). But see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (allowing a municipal-
ity to continue any legal action against a debtor in order to protect the health and welfare of 
citizens). The NMAG ultimately obtained an order allowing it to proceed to collect its judg-
ment on the grounds that the judgment protected the health and public welfare of the people 
of the state under section 362(b)(4). See id.; Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Appli-
cation for Preliminary Injunction, In re FastBucks Holding Corp., No. 12-37793-11  (N.D. 
Tex. Mar. 4, 2013). 
 174. Horton Declaration, supra note 171, at 3. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 6. 
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branches throughout Texas, Nevada, New Mexico, Idaho, and Utah.177 
Business in New Mexico, the nation’s third poorest state,178 was particular-
ly fertile, with a total of twenty-eight of sixty stores generating approxi-
mately 58% of FastBucks’s revenues.179  
FastBucks ultimately argued that the NMAG’s attempts to enforce its 
state court judgment finding FastBucks loans to be unlawful, as well as the 
NMAG’s attempts to inform customers that they did not need to repay their 
loans, interfered with FastBucks’s business and violated the automatic 
stay.180 The bankruptcy court disagreed, finding no stay violation and refus-
  
 177. Id. at 4.  
 178. State and County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 6, 2014),  
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/35000.html (showing a poverty rate of 19% compared 
to a national average of 14.9%). 
 179. Complaint and Application for Preliminary Injunction, In re Fastbucks Holdings 
Corp., No. 12-37793-11, at 4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint to Enjoin 
NMAG]. FastBucks claimed to have approximately 160 employees, all non-union, many of 
whom have a unique expertise understanding the debtor’s infrastructure and operations. 
Horton Declaration, supra note 171, at 11. Indeed, the debtor recently brought a lawsuit 
against one who allegedly stole some of these trade secrets. Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 
Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for an Order Approving Compro-
mise and Settlement Agreement with Debbie Lopez and Cash Station, Inc., In re Fastbucks 
Holdings Corp., No. 12-37793-11 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2013). 
 180. Complaint to Enjoin NMAG, supra note 179, at 19-22. Shortly after filing its 
bankruptcy case, FastBucks argued that NMAG’s attempts to collect its judgment and to 
inform consumers that FastBucks’s loans were illegal under state law interfered with its 
business. Id. at 2-3. As a result, FastBucks asked the bankruptcy court to enjoin the Attorney 
General’s office from: 
1) issuing press releases or publicly commenting regarding 
[FastBucks or] their bankruptcy cases . . .  
 
2) contacting [FastBucks’s] customers [about the loans], to 
seek out information concerning customers’ loans, or to advise 
to [the FastBucks’s] customers or other members of the public 
who may contact the Attorney General’s office . . . [and] 
 
3) attempting to enforce [a New Mexico state court’s order 
finding FastBucks loans to be  illegal]. 
Id. FastBucks claimed that allowing NMAG to issue any press releases in the case, or even 
speak publicly about the case, could hurt FastBucks’s business, that its loans are “perfectly 
legal under New Mexico law,” id. at 4, and that New Mexico has a robust regulatory 
scheme, despite the fact that all consumers over thirty days long are essentially completely 
unregulated. Id. at 6. FastBucks further claimed in its complaint that the court’s order find-
ing their loans unconscionable is unconstitutional because only the state regulatory authority, 
the New Mexico Financial Institutions Division, can declare their actions illegal, not courts. 
Complaint to Enjoin NMAG, supra note 179, at 6-9. FastBucks notes that the regulatory 
agency in charge, the New Mexico Financial Institutions Division (FID) has given Fast-
Bucks a license to make loans each time it has requested such a license and that it is clear 
from this action that the FID has no problem with FastBucks’s business. Id. at 6. Again, 
never in history has the FID taken any action to curb harmful lending practices. These argu-
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ing to enjoin the NMAG from issuing future press releases or talking about 
the case publicly, on First Amendment grounds.181 The bankruptcy court 
held that since FastBucks neither complied with the state court’s order nor 
had the final order set aside, FastBucks “cannot seriously complain that 
enforcement would cause harm to [their] business and accounts receivable. 
It is well established that those seeking equity must do equity.”182  
In connection with a motion by the NMAG to exclude its actions from 
the automatic stay, FastBucks claimed that the NMAG is not protecting the 
public from anything because “the Attorney General [would] need to sue 
each lender and collect a similar type of judgment, in order to impose inter-
est rate caps on installments loans throughout New Mexico.”183 Using the 
inefficiency of state courts in policing high-cost credit to its advantage, 
FastBucks relied heavily on the fact that another court in the same exact 
state found no liability under similar circumstances.184 FastBucks further 
argued that if the other lender won under these circumstances and facts, it 
must win too.185 Whether the argument is frivolous or meritorious, the re-
sult is the same. This lender is still making loans in a state in which the 
loans have been outlawed by a state court.  
3. Anti-Class Action and Arbitration Clauses Further Limit      
Customer Enforcement of the Law 
The lack of a federal usury cap really stings consumers in light of re-
cent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of anti-class action and arbi-
tration clauses in consumer contracts. Payday and title loans contracts often 
  
ments by lenders demonstrate why it is so difficult for courts to use unconscionability to 
police high costs loans. Id. at 8. FastBucks also claimed that the entire lawsuit by the New 
Mexico Attorney General’s Office was nothing but an attempt to harass FastBucks and put it 
out of business. Id. at 20. FastBucks further claims that the NMAG suit and the NMAG’s 
subsequent contacts with consumers in New Mexico constitute an interference with Fast-
Bucks’s business and its account receivable. Id. at 13. As evidence, FastBucks noted that 
since the state court found its loans to be unconscionable, bad loans have increased from 
4.7% to 16.5%.  Complaint to Enjoin NMAG, supra note 179, at 19-22. 
 181. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Application for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, In re Fastbucks Holdings Corp., No. 12-37793-11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2013). 
 182. Id. at 5. In the context of the Complaint to Enjoin NMAG, FastBucks told the 
bankruptcy court that after NMAG’s press release, customers not only stopped paying, but a 
few even called and claimed that FastBucks was overcharging them. Complaint to Enjoin 
NMAG, supra note 179, at 21. NMAG ultimately requested that the bankruptcy court clarify 
that its actions to enforce its judgment were not stayed under section 362(b)(4) because these 
actions fall within NMAG’s police power and protect the health and welfare of the people of 
New Mexico. Id. at 17. 
 183. Id. at 18. 
 184. Id. at 18-19. 
 185. Id. 
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contain clauses requiring that all disputes be resolved in arbitration and also 
that limit a customer’s right to participate in any class action related to the 
loans. Once thought to be unconscionable, these clauses are now generally 
enforceable under the U.S. Supreme Court decision, AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,186 which resolved a split in the circuits and explicitly upheld 
the ability of companies to use arbitration clauses to exempt themselves 
from class actions.187 While the precise impact of Concepcion is yet to be 
determined, the Court’s holding makes it clear that companies can avoid not 
only court trials but also class-wide arbitration proceedings simply by in-
corporating a class arbitration waiver within the scope of an arbitration pro-
vision.188 As recognized by Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissenting opinion 
in Concepcion, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million 
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues 
for $30.”189 The obvious result is that consumers with low dollar complaints 
against any business will be less able to pursue their claims.190 
4. Even with Caps, State Usury Laws Are Inefficient and Ineffective 
Sometimes states have interest rate caps, but lenders ignore them any-
way. In a recent large-scale debt collection action in Arkansas, a state with 
an 18% interest rate cap for all loans, a Kansas debt collection agency 
bought a huge book of payday loans made to Arkansas citizens, none of 
which were enforceable under Arkansas law.191 The debt collection agency 
ultimately agreed to cancel more than $2.7 million in payday loan debts of 
Arkansans and will pay the state $200,000 to settle a lawsuit over its collec-
tion efforts.192 The State Attorney General’s Office had to use extensive 
resources to garner the settlement, which should never have been necessary 
in the first place.193 The collector had misrepresented to thousands of Ar-
kansas consumers that the debts it attempted to collect were enforceable 
and collectible, even though they were clearly illegal under Arkansas 
  
 186. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1740 (2011). 
 187. Todd Seaman, Note, Drowning in the Wake of Concepcion: How to Protect 
Small Claims Plaintiffs Bound by Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 
50 (2012). 
 188. Id.  
 189. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Carnegie v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)), quoted in Seaman, supra note 187. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Settlement Ends Bid to Collect on Payday Loans, ARKANSAS NEWS (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://arkansasnews.com/sections/news/arkansas/settlement-ends-bid-collect-payday-
loans.html. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
2014] THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL USURY CAP  
 
297 
law.194 The company may face additional monetary penalties if it fails to 
notify affected consumers in writing that their debts have been cancelled, 
creating yet another enforcement obligation for state attorneys general.195 
While lenders could also ignore federal interest rate caps, this would be less 
likely. The state law patchwork makes it complicated to learn each state 
laws and a federal cap could eliminate that complication once and for all.  
V.     WHY MAKE A FEDERAL CASE OUT OF THIS, RATHER THAN 
ENCOURAGING STATES TO IMPLEMENT A 36% CAP? 
Given the failure of states, a federal cap is the only option left. Coor-
dinating fifty states on this or any issue is complex and difficult work. Con-
gress, on the other hand, need pass just one law to accomplish a national 
usury cap. Consumers can and do cross borders to borrow money, and 
states have no particular interest in caps. Moreover, the entire country is a 
common market, such that any state’s regulation of interest rates inherently 
reaches across borders. Thus, there is a need for uniformity on interest rates 
across those borders, which only Congress can provide.196 
Congress unquestionably has the power to set federal interest rate caps 
through the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.197 Indeed, in recent 
years the regulation of consumer credit has become even more of a federal, 
rather than a state, regime.198 Additionally, Congress already has experience 
setting a 36% cap that protects some, but not all, Americans. In 2007, Con-
  
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Need for uniformity is one obvious reason for the federal government to come 
in and legislate. See Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process 
in an Increasingly International World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 356 (2007); Charles W. Wolfe, 
Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985: Congress Preempts the ‘Farm Products 
Exception’ of Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 55 UMKC L. REV. 454, 
456 (1987). 
 197. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See also Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collec-
tive Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 171-
73 (2010). Indeed, there are numerous examples of federal consumer protection laws, includ-
ing TILA, HOEPA, and the recent Card Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). 
 198. See Elizabeth R. Schlitz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal 
Preemption of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 928 (2008). See 
also Boss, supra note 196, at 353-54. Professor Boss notes that when the Uniform Commer-
cial Code process was first promulgated, there was a struggle between state and federal law 
and the process of enacting even the uniform statute was left up to states because of deep 
antifederalism sentiments stemming way back. Id. States believed that each of them was 
unique and that federal intrusion into state commercial law could lead to federal domination 
over states. Id. This fear was exacerbated by the fact that most of the members of Congress 
came from rural backgrounds where fear of federal control was even stronger. E. Hunter 
Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of 
Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 361-62 (1978). 
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gress passed the Military Lending Act (MLA),199 which purported to place 
a 36% interest rate cap on consumer loans and to prohibit lenders from en-
gaging in predatory practices toward active-duty military members and 
their dependent family members.200 
In passing the MLA, military lenders were deeply concerned about the 
effects of predatory lending on military readiness. When they realized state 
lawmakers were unable or unwilling to pass laws protecting the troops, 
these leaders focused their efforts on passing federal legislation.201 In 2006, 
the United States Department of Defense (DOD) issued a report finding 
“that payday lending ‘harms the morale of troops and their families, and 
adds to the cost of fielding an all-volunteer fighting force.’”202 Congress 
noted that lenders were blatantly targeting the military by clustering in large 
numbers “near military bases” and using “military-sounding names”203 and 
  
 199. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(b) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 113-74 approved 1-
16-14); 32 C.F.R. § 232.4(b) (2007).  
 200. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(b); 32 C.F.R. § 232.4(b). While it is unclear from the legisla-
tive history which constitutional authority was used to pass the MLA itself, a 2013 amend-
ment was passed under this authority:  
The constitutional authority on which this bill rests is the pow-
er of Congress “to provide for the common Defense”, “to raise 
and support Armies”, “to provide and maintain a Navy” and 
“to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces” as enumerated in Article I, section 8 of the 
United States Constitution. 
See H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2013), which  amended the Military Lending Act in 
2013 (P.L. 112-239). Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987, added Oct. 17, 2006, P.L. 109-
364, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle F, § 670(a); amended Jan. 2, 2013, P.L. 112-239, Div A, Title 
VI, Subtitle G, §§ 661(a), (b), 662(a), (b), 663.  
 201. Johnson, supra note 7, at 661.  
 202. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED 
AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (Aug. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf, cited in Johnson, 
supra note 7, at 661. In Senate hearings on the MLA, Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.) thanked 
members of Congress for ensuring that our troops have a good situation now and will not be 
the victims of loan sharks. Id. at 667. “Similarly, Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) criticized 
the practice of rollovers and commented that ‘[p]ayday lenders are legal loan sharks that 
offer small, short-term loans at interest rates of 100, 500, even 1,000 percent.’” Id. at 661.  
 203. Johnson, supra note 7, at 668. Researchers could identify the types of business-
es targeting military personnel around military bases by conducting electronic searches. Id. 
Perhaps more obviously, senators argued that payday loans interfered with military prepar-
edness by interfering with security clearances and also by making it so that soldiers cannot 
devote their attention to their jobs. This in turn negatively affects their performance. Id. at 
672. As explained by Republican Representative Walter Jones, Jr.,“[w]hen relatively unso-
phisticated borrowers are unable to readily repay a loan from these lenders, they can become 
consumed with worries over their debt and this undercuts their abilities to fulfill their mili-
tary duties.” 151 CONG.. REC.. E1487-01 (daily ed. July 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jones), 
quoted in Johnson, supra note 7, at 668. The MLA purports to impose a 36% APR cap on 
payday loans, vehicle title loans, and tax refund loans to active-duty military personnel and 
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also that military personnel lacked sophistication in financial matters and 
were easily taken advantage of.204  
While there was early evidence that the MLA curbed predatory lend-
ing to military communities,205 more recent evidence suggests that even the 
MLA is mired by loopholes. A recent news story recounts how loopholes in 
the MLA:  
threaten to leave hundreds of thousands of service 
members across the country vulnerable to poten-
tially predatory loans — from credit pitched by re-
tailers to pay for electronics or furniture, to auto-
title loans to payday-style loans. The law, the au-
  
their dependents.  Johnson, supra note 7, at 662. The definition of annual percentage rate in 
the MLA is broader than the definition under the Truth in Lending Act and is called the 
Military APR (MAPR) Id. The MAPR was intended to keep lenders from misleading mili-
tary borrowers and requires them to include all of their fees in the MAPR calculation. “The 
MLA restricts a lender’s ability to debit [a] borrower’s bank account unless the loan com-
plies with the MAPR calculation and the MAPR is capped at 36% or less.” Id. at 662. Addi-
tionally, “[t]he MLA also preempts any inconsistent state or federal laws[,] . . . prohibits 
rollovers, and prohibits lenders from distributing multiple loans simultaneously to a military 
borrower.” Id. at 663. Finally, “[t]he MLA applies to all financial institutions . . . so long as 
their loans are defined as payday loans and it makes any agreement to arbitrate disputes” 
with a military member unenforceable. Id. at 663. 
 204. Johnson, supra note 7, at 671. For example, Senator Jim Talent (R-Mo.) argued 
that payday lending “is ruining the financial lives of thousands of our service men and wom-
en who unknowingly, because of their lack of sophistication, get into debts from these abu-
sive lenders, far greater than they are able to pay.” 152 CONG.. REC.. S6405, S6406 (daily 
ed. Jun. 22, 2006) (statement of Sen. Talent), quoted in Johnson, supra note 7, at 671. He 
further noted that the young age and lack of higher education of many soldiers set them up 
for financial predation. Johnson, supra note 7, at 671. 
 205. After Enactment of the MLA, payday loans decreased and affordable loans 
increased. As Professor Johnson recounts, “[t]he success in the decrease in payday loans is 
not attributable solely to passage of the MLA but also to an increase in education outreach 
directed to military families and an increase in the supply of affordable loans.” Johnson, 
supra note 7, at 664. Moreover, several military societies began to offer smaller value inter-
est-free loans and gave service members assistance on creating budgets and repayment 
plans. Politicians and military leaders also stepped in and influenced banks and credit unions 
near military bases to offer low-interest loans: 
[I]n its 2008 report on implementation of the regulations 
adopted under the MLA, the DOD stated that several banks 
and credit unions were offering low-cost loans to military fam-
ilies at hundreds of military installations worldwide and mili-
tary families were increasingly using these loan products. The 
Defense Credit Union Council, for instance, had 47 credit un-
ions offering low-cost loans and lines of credit at 135 military 
installations. The average interest rate on these loans was a 
17% APR with no additional fees. 
Id. at 665.  
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thorities say, has not kept pace with high-interest 
lenders that focus on servicemen and women, both 
online and near bases.206  
The Consumer Federation of America has reported twice on the loop-
holes.207 As Jean Ann Fox and her cohorts report, the MLA protections, 
including the 36% military annual percentage rate, apply to only certain 
types of payday and vehicle title loans as defined by a Department of De-
fense rule adopted in 2007.208 Given the limited definitions of loans cov-
ered, the MLA limits interest and otherwise applies only to payday loans 
with a term of ninety-one days or shorter, in which the amount financed 
does not exceed $2,000 and in which the borrower pays with a post-dated 
check209 and title loans with a term of 181 days or fewer that is secured by 
the title to a motor vehicle that has been registered for use on public roads 
and owned by a covered borrower.210  
  
 206. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eves, Service Members Left Vulnerable to 
Payday Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/service-members-left-vulnerable-to-payday-
loans/?_r=1. 
 207. FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra note 29, at 1. This report is an update to a prior 
reported entitled, JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE MILITARY LENDING ACT 
FIVE YEARS LATER ( 2012), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Studies.MilitaryLendingAct.5.29.12.pdf. 
 208. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(b) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 113-74 approved 1-
16-14), cited in FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra note 29, at 1; 32 C.F.R. § 232.4(b) (2007), 
cited in FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra note 29, at 1. 
 209. FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra note 29, at 3. More specifically, this section pro-
vides that these protections apply to a transaction in which the lender either: 
a. Receives funds from and incurs interest and/or is charged a 
fee by a creditor and provides a post-dated check or other 
payment instrument to the creditor who agrees with the cov-
ered borrower not to deposit or present the check or payment 
instrument for more than one day, or;  
b. Receives funds from and incurs interest and/or is charged a 
fee by a creditor, and contemporaneously with the receipt of 
funds, authorizes the creditor to initiate a debit or debits to the 
covered borrower’s deposit account (by electronic fund trans-
fer or remotely created check) after one or more days.  
Id. at 1-2. 
 210. Id. at 3. For the loans covered, the rule prohibits lenders from:  
1. Charging more than 36 percent annual interest, which in-
cludes most fees (but not late or default fees) and any premi-
ums for credit insurance sold in conjunction with the loan. 
This inclusive interest rate cap is stated as the Military Annual 
Percentage Rate (MAPR). 
2. Securing a loan with a personal check or other access to the 
borrower’s bank account, title to a personal vehicle, or requir-
ing payment by military allotment.  
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The MLA has loopholes but is far better than most state laws at limit-
ing those loopholes. As “[t]he Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
[recent] white paper entitled Payday Loans and Deposit Advance Products 
[reports], variations of the traditional two-week payday loan, including 
longer-term payday installment and open-end payday loans, are common 
and often driven by state law.”211 Indeed, both the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have 
found “that open-end deposit advance loans made by depository institu-
tions, or bank payday loans, posed many of the same problems as other 
payday loans.”212  
These comments further demonstrate the limits of state law in regulat-
ing high-cost lending. On the other hand, despite its limitations, the MLA 
demonstrates that Congress can impose federal caps and can now learn 
from whatever mistakes were made in the MLA. Federal, as opposed to 
state, laws provide general benefits that are equally beneficial here. Profes-
sor Creola Johnson forcefully argues that many military families are better 
  
3. Charging prepayment penalties and engaging in roll-overs, 
renewals, refinancing or consolidation unless the renewal is at 
better terms for the borrower, such as a lower cost. 
4. Including mandatory arbitration clauses, waiver of legal 
rights, and onerous legal notices in case of disputes in the loan 
contract.  
32 C.F.R. § 232.3(b) (2007), cited in FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra note 29, at 3  
 211. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE 
PRODUCTS, A WHITE PAPER OF INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 8 (2013), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf, cited in 
FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra note 29, at 3. This means that the law does not cover:  
Payday loans with a loan term longer than 91 days; or vehicle 
title loans with a loan term longer than 181 days;  
[p]ayday, car title, or tax refund loans that are structured as 
open-end credit, including payday loans made by banks;  
[p]ayday loans for amounts larger than $2,000; and 
[o]ther general consumer credit transactions such as install-
ment lending, open-end credit, and retail installment credit ei-
ther excluded or not specifically included in the [MLA]. 
Id. at 3. To make matters worse, lenders who specialize in loans to military personnel have 
official sounding names like Military Financial, Just Military Loans, and Patriot Loans. See 
Silver-Greenberg & Eves, supra note 206. They like lending to the military because they get 
paid from the military allotment, which virtually assures payment. Moreover, soldiers have 
to stay in good financial shape in order to maintain their security clearance, which means 
lenders have maximum leverage over their borrowers. One lender’s website claims: “We 
know the military because we are former military.” Id. Lenders also lure customers by offer-
ing twenty-five-dollar Starbucks gift cards for referrals and throw parties with free food. Id. 
 212. FELTNER, FOX & UDIS, supra note 29, at 3 (citing proposed guidelines for ad-
dressing these loopholes, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-04-
30/pdf/2013-10101.pdf and http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-04-30/pdf/2013-
10094.pdf).  
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off financially than many other payday loan customers and that, as a result, 
non-military families should be equally well protected from predatory lend-
ers.213 Moreover, Congress can learn from the experience gleaned from the 
MLA and pass a law that better serves all Americans. Finally, the federal 
government has the power to enforce a federal usury cap through the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau,214 whereas most states lack sufficient 
enforcement power.    
 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
 
Congress clearly has the power to set a federal interest rate cap, as it 
has done in the past with the MLA. We also can learn what not to do from 
the MLA and from states’ attempts to regulate high-cost lending. Congress 
can adopt neat and trim laws that cap interest on all consumer loans, with 
no exceptions. There are several ways to accomplish this but the most obvi-
ous would be for Congress to simply pass a usury cap similar to an effective 
state usury cap, but applicable to the entire U.S.  
For example, a Massachusetts state statute caps interest, including all 
fees of any kind, at 20% for all loans, makes it a crime to loan for an inter-
est rate above this amount, and allows the Massachusetts Supreme Court to 
declare any loan made for an amount greater than this rate to declare the 
loan void.215 Arkansas caps interest at 17% through its state constitution.216 
One possibility would be to adopt a federal statute similar to this one: 
(A) Cap on all loans made in the United Sates or to a 
United States Citizen 
(i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any 
contract entered into after the effective date of this 
law shall not exceed thirty-six percent (36%) per 
annum, including all interest, costs and fees of any 
kind, including but not limited to fees for extend-
ing credit; fees born-out of default (late fees, over-
draft fees, limit fees, etc.); fees defined as a “fi-
nance charge;” interest, brokerage, recording fees, 
  
 213. Johnson, supra note 7, at 679. 
 214. Congress established the CFPB in part to enforce consumer protection laws. 
Apply Now for the CFPB Enforcement Team, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/jobs/enforcement-attorneys/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
 215. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 271, § 49(a) (West, Westlaw current through 
chapter 38 of the 2nd annual session). 
 216. ARK. CONST., art. 19, § 13. The rate is actually no more than 5% per annum 
above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate up to 17% and any loan made in excess of 17% is 
void as to both the principal and the interest. 
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commissions, services, extension of loan, 
forbearance to enforce payment, and all other sums 
charged against or paid or to be paid by the 
borrower for making or securing directly or 
indirectly the loan or any other fees of any kind 
(collectively, “Interest”).  
(ii) Any contracts having a rate of Interest in ex-
cess of that allowed in part (i) above is void as to 
both unpaid principal and Interest. 
 
(iii) A person who has paid interest in excess of 
the maximum lawful rate may recover, within the 
time provided by law, twice the amount of princi-
pal and interest paid.  
 
(iv) The provisions of this law are not intended and 
shall not be deemed to supersede or otherwise in-
validate any provisions of state law that sets an in-
terest rate cap that is lower than that set forth here.  
(v) The provisions of this law revoke all provisions 
of State law which establish the maximum rate of 
interest chargeable in the State that is higher than 
the rate set forth herein, or that through any other 
state law, directly or indirectly allow a rate of in-
terest to be changed by any creditor that exceeds 
the amounts set out herein. 217 
Regardless of the precise method, Congress needs to act based upon 
broad and deep public support for interest rate caps on both sides of the 
  
 217. Another possible solution that already has been proposed is to amend TILA so 
that no storefront or online payday lender may charge a rate of interest or a fee that exceeds 
36%. S. 3452, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112s3452is/pdf/BILLS-112s3452is.pdf. This proposed bill, which has not advanced in Con-
gress yet, broadly defines “fees” and “interests rates” to include “payments compensating 
creditors for . . . cash advance fees.” The bill defines what encompasses fees and interest 
rates as: 1) fees for extending credit; 2) fees born-out of default (late fees, overdraft fees, 
limit fees, etc.); 3) fees defined as a “finance charge”; 4) “credit insurance premiums”; and 
5) “all charges and costs for ancillary products sold in connection with” the payday loan. Id. 
§ 141(b). It also gives individuals rights to sue lenders who violate the law, and to collect the 
greater of three times the amount of the total accrued debt associated with the violating 
transaction or $50,000. Id. §§ 141(h)-141(i). Violators also would be subject to criminal 
punishment, including one year in prison and a fine amounting to the greater of three times 
the amount of the total accrued debt associated with the transaction or $50,000. Id. §§ 
141(i)(1)-141(i)(2).  
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political spectrum and the failure of states to uniformly pass such caps, de-
spite widespread public desire for caps. While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank Act) has opened the 
door to federal regulation by giving the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau (CFPB) power to study and regulate payday loans and other fringe 
lending products,218 the Dodd Frank Act does not permit the CFPB to set 
interest rate caps.219 Thus, while CFPB power may result in meaningful 
regulation of payday lending, and indeed, payday lending now has the 
CFPB’s attention,220 only Congress can swiftly stop the waste created by 
existing patchwork state laws and state enforcement actions.  
While setting usury or interest rate caps may at one time have been the 
purview of states, that time has come and gone. States’ attempts to regulate 
high-cost loans have been costly and inefficient, as have the efforts of state 
courts to police the loans under unconscionability or other common law 
theories. If states are unable to pass effective interest rate caps despite the 
desires of their constituents, it is time for Congress to act.  
 
  
 218. See Michael B. Mierzewski et al., The Dodd-Frank Act Establishes the Bureau 
of Consumer Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Prod-
ucts and Services, 127 BANKING L.J. 722, 723-31 (2010) (discussing the authority and duties 
of the CFPB). 
 219. Plunkett & Hurtado, supra note 8, at 51; Payday Loans and Cash Advances, 
CONSUMER.GOV, http://www.consumer.gov/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).  
 220. Plunkett & Hurtado, supra note 8, at 51. See also David S. Evans & Joshua D. 
Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 Would Change the 
Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REP.: RISK AND 
COMPLIANCE 1, 3-4 (Oct. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491117 (critiquing 
the CFPA Act for advocating broad applications without adequate evidentiary basis).  
